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This paper sets out a view of a General Jurisprudence that is
needed to underpin the institutionalized discipline of law as it
becomes more cosmopolitan in the context of "globalization" and
considers its implications .
Part I restates a position on the mission and nature of the
discipline of law and of the role of jurisprudence, as its theoretical
part, in contributing to the health of the discipline. Part II clarifies
some questions that have been raised about this conception of General
Jurisprudence: (a) the implications of "globalization;" (b) the meaning
of "General Jurisprudence" in this context; (c) the relationship
2 The term "cosmopolitan" is sometimes used to refer to a universalist ethos
proclaiming loyalty to humankind, see, e.g., DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND
THE GLOBAL ORDER (1995); and MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY:
DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996). However, it is
sometimes used more ambivalently to express the tensions between universalism
and particularism, as in the term "cosmopolite," which suggests "[a] citizen of
the world who has no national attachments and prejudices ... often contrasted
with patriot and so is either reproachful or complimentary." 3 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 986 (2d ed. 1989). In the present context, I prefer the
second usage, which expresses caution about "globalization" better than
"international," "transnational," or "global." See, e.g., David Harvey's witty
paper, Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils, 12 PUB.
CULTURE 529 (2000).
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between Jurisprudence, Legal Philosophy, and social scientific
approaches to law; and (d) the significance of the idea of "non-state
law." Part III illustrates through concrete examples some
implications for possible agendas and issues suggested by this model
within the areas roughly characterized as analytical, normative,
empirical, and critical jurisprudence; including a critical analysis of
the assumptions and presuppositions typically underpinning
mainstream work in fields such as comparative law, public
international law, religious law, and socio-legal studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to set out a view of a revived
General Jurisprudence as part of an increasingly cosmopolitan
discipline of law, to clarify some issues that have been raised about
this view, and to illustrate some of its potential implications and
applications.
I have written this paper from the standpoint of an English jurist
who is concerned about the health of the institutionalized discipline of
law, especially in common law countries, during the next fifteen to
twenty years in the face of "globalization." I am based in London and
Florida, but I have traveled widely and have worked in several
countries, mainly in Eastern Africa, the United States, the
Commonwealth, and the Netherlands. My background, experience,
and outlook are quite cosmopolitan, but my biases and culture are
British, my training is in the common law, and my main language is
English. My aim is to develop a vision for General Jurisprudence for
Western jurists in the early years of this Millennium. A jurist from a
different tradition approaching the same issues from another vantage
point would probably present a significantly different picture as few
of us can break away very far from our intellectual roots.
This paper could be interpreted as a plea for a less parochial
jurisprudence. It might even be read as a polemic suggesting that
Anglo-American jurisprudence in recent years has been narrow in its
concerns, abysmally ignorant of other legal traditions, and
ethnocentric in its biases. This is partly correct. However, in talking
of "parochialism," it is useful to distinguish between provenance,
sources, audience, focus, perspectives, and significance. 3 My
3 TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 128-29.
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argument does indeed suggest that we should pay more attention to
other legal traditions, that the agenda of issues for jurisprudence
needs to be reviewed and broadened, that the juristic canon should be
extended, and that there is much to be learned from adopting a global
perspective. However, in some respects the perspective is also self-
consciously quite parochial, reflecting my own biases and limited
knowledge and the fact that I address here a very largely Western
audience.
In my view, jurisprudence is the theoretical part of law as a
discipline. The mission of an institutionalized discipline is the
advancement and dissemination of knowledge and critical
understanding about the subject matters of the discipline. Legal
scholarship is concerned with the advancement of knowledge and the
critical understanding of law. Legal education is one part of the
discipline of law that is concerned with dissemination of knowledge
and critical understanding, including know-what, know-how, and
know-why, of its subject matters and operations. This paper is
concerned in the first instance with legal scholarship and legal theory
- with what is involved in advancing the understanding of law from a
global or transnational perspective and only indirectly with the
implications of this for the teaching of law.4
How any discipline is institutionalized varies according to
time, place, and tradition. Law is no different. Because of this
historical contingency, there is no settled core or essence of the
subject matters of our discipline or of legal knowledge. 5 I shall argue
for a broad (and pluralistic) interpretation of these subject matters, but
4 At this stage in history, most forms of international and transnational legal
practice are quite specialized. On the one hand, few law students and legal
scholars can focus exclusively on a single jurisdiction. On the other hand, we
are some way from a situation in which primary legal education can sensibly be
geared toward the production of global lawyers or Euro-lawyers, or even
specialists in international law. A cosmopolitan discipline does not mandate
neglect of local knowledge, but law students can generally benefit from being
presented with broad perspectives and from being made aware of different levels
of legal ordering and their interactions. See William Twining, A Cosmopolitan
Discipline? Some Implications of "Globalisation "for Legal Education, 8 INT'L
J. LEGAL PROF. 23 (2001); and William Twining, Cosmopolitan Legal Studies, 9
INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 99 (2001).
5 See generally WILLIAM TWINING, BLACKSTONE'S TOWER: THE ENGLISH LAW
SCHOOL 153-189 (1994) (discussing the idea of the "core" of a discipline).
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I am well aware that not all of my audience will agree with me. The
purposes, methods, and scope of the discipline are frequently
contested.
At the risk of over-simplification, if one adopts a global
perspective and a long time scale, one can discern some general
tendencies and biases in Western academic legal culture that are in
the process of coming under sustained challenge in the context of
"globalization." In crude form, these can be expressed as a series of
simplistic assumptions that are constituent propositions of an ideal
type:
(a) That law consists of two principal kinds of
ordering: municipal state law and public
international law (classically conceived as
ordering the relations between states: "the
Westphalian duo");
(b) that nation-states, societies, and legal
systems are very largely closed, self-
contained entities that can be studied in
isolation;
(c) that modem law and modem jurisprudence
are secular and now largely independent of
their historical-cultural roots in the Judeo-
Christian traditions;
(d) that modem state law is primarily rational-
bureaucratic and instrumental, performing
certain functions and serving as a means
for achieving particular social ends;
(e) that law is best understood through the
"top-down" perspectives of rulers, policy
makers, officials, legislators, and elites
with the points of view of users,
consumers, victims, and other subjects
being at best marginal;
6
6 See TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 108-35; see also BRIAN TAMANAHA, A
GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 239-40 (2001) [hereinafter "A
GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE].
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(f) that the main subject matters of the
discipline of law are ideas and norms
rather than the empirical study of social
facts;
(g) that modem state law is almost exclusively
a Northern European/ Anglo-American
creation, diffused through most of the
world via colonialism, imperialism, trade,
and latter-day post-colonial influences;
(h) that the study of non-Western legal
traditions is a marginal and unimportant
part of Western academic law;
(i) that the fundamental values underlying
modem law are universal, although the
philosophical foundations are diverse.
In short, during the twentieth century and before, Western
academic legal culture has tended to be state-oriented, secular,
positivist, "top-down," Northo-centric, unempirical, and universalist
in respect to morals. Of course, all of these generalizations are crude
and subject to exceptions - indeed, none has gone unchallenged
within the Western legal tradition - and issues surrounding nearly all
of them constitute a high proportion of the contested agenda of
modem Western jurisprudence. However, at a general level, this bald
ideal type highlights some crucial points at which such ideas and
assumptions are being increasingly challenged.
Jurisprudence, as the theoretical part of law as a discipline,
has a number of functions to perform in order to contribute to its
health. 8 To clarify, "Jurisprudence," "Legal Theory," and "Legal
Philosophy" do not have settled meanings in either the Anglo-
American or the Continental European traditions. In order to be brief,
I shall stipulate how I use them here rather than enter into
controversies that are partly semantic, but also partly ideological. As
we shall see in Part 1Ic, I treat jurisprudence and legal theory as
7 For example, natural law, utilitarianism, and neo-kantianism are all
universalist. See discussion of different meanings of universalism infra Part 1iB.
8 For more detailed discussions, see WILLIAM TWINING, LAW IN CONTEXT:
ENLARGING A DISCIPLINE 110-30, 131-48 (1997) [hereinafter LIC].
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synonyms and legal philosophy as the most abstract part of
jurisprudence.
In this view, jurisprudence can be viewed as a heritage, as an
ideology, and as the activity of theorizing that is posing, reposing,
answering, and arguing about general questions relating to the subject
matters of law as a discipline. The idea of heritage emphasizes
continuity. The idea of ideology (in a non-pejorative sense) links
one's beliefs about law to one's more general beliefs about the world
whether or not they are systematic. In the Marxian pejorative
interpretation of the term, the notion of ideology serves as a healthy
reminder of the close connections between belief, self-interest,
prejudice, and delusion.
As an activity within our discipline, theorizing has several
functions: constructing whole views or total pictures (the synthesizing
or mapping function); elucidating, constructing, and refining
concepts; developing normative theories, middle-order hypotheses,
and general working theories for participants; building bridges with
other disciplines (the conduit function); intellectual history; and, most
important, critically examining the underlying assumptions of
different kinds of discourses of and about law.9 This pragmatic
conception of legal theorizing emphasizes the crucial role of
jurisprudence in the development of law as a discipline, even though
in a participant-oriented discipline it is natural, and often healthy, that
practice should outrun theory.
Students coming to jurisprudence for the first time often find
themselves bewildered and daunted by the disorderly profusion of our
heritage of legal thought. One leading British student work discusses
the ideas of over one hundred thinkers, yet the author "regrets" not
finding room for many other significant figures. 10 On examination it
9 Id. at 110-14.
10 M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE vi (7th ed.
2001). Another recent student reader on jurisprudence, JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL THEORY (James Penner, Nicola Lacey, David Schiff & Richard Nobles,
eds., 2002), heroically tries to give a broad conspectus by adopting a historical
perspective by regularly crossing disciplinary boundaries, by moving beyond
Anglo-American authors and transnational classics, such as Aquinas, Kant,
Kelsen and Weber, to include modem Continental Europeans, such as Derrida,
Foucault, Lacan, Habermas, and Luhmann. Although it extends over 1,000
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becomes obvious that the student focused almost entirely on modem
Western, mainly Anglo-American, theories about law. The index
does not mention Hindu, Islamic, or Jewish jurisprudence and there
are only passing references to Chinese, Japanese, Latin American, and
African traditions. The work, therefore, presents only part of the total
picture of the heritage of legal theory.
Even if the spotlight focuses solely on Anglo-American
jurists, the picture remains daunting. For example, the few students
who study any of Jeremy Bentham's writings usually focus on a few
chapters of one early work: An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation. This represents less than one percent of his
entire body of work, which will in time extend to 68-70 substantial
volumes. Yet Bentham is only one of almost a hundred English and
American thinkers represented in Lloyd and Freeman's Introduction
to Jurisprudence. No history of Anglo-American jurisprudence can
be sensibly restricted to thinkers who were English-speaking lawyers.
Even quite narrow conceptions of the agenda of jurisprudence
recognize that at least some of the central issues are shared with other
disciplines. For example, concerns about justice and rights are shared
with ethics, political theory, literary theory, theology, psychology,
economics, and sociology among others.
The extent and diversity of the heritage of Anglo-American
jurisprudence poses problems of selection even within that tradition
when used for particular purposes, such as legal education and, more
generally, for communities of scholars as well as for individuals.
Texts and authors get "canonized" partly on perceived merit, but as
often as not quite arbitrarily. No agreed upon criteria of selection
exists. Inertia, fashion, ideology, power, self-promotion, and
serendipity often influence the choices that are made. However,
surveys of jurisprudence courses and statistics of citation tend to
converge in identifying a fairly consistent short list of individual
authors who are widely read and studied at a given time." A
pages, like Freeman, the editors lament that they have been forced to make
significant omissions for reasons of space. Id. at vii.
" See e.g., the series of surveys on how jurisprudence is being taught in the
United Kingdom: R. Cotterrell & J.C. Woodliffe, The Teaching of
Jurisprudence in British Universities, 1974 J. SOC'Y PUB. TEACHERS L. 74
(1974); Hilaire Barnett & Dianna Yach, The Teaching of Jurisprudence in
British Universities and Polytechnics, 5 LEGAL STUD. 151 (1985); and Hilaire
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mainstream and something approaching a canonical core exists, but
the core changes constantly and a rather healthy pluralism surrounds
it.
Fairly orthodox accounts depict the Anglo-American tradition
as extending over several centuries, as multi-disciplinary, and by no
means confined to Anglophone authors. Plato and Aristotle, Kant and
Kelsen, Marx and Weber, Foucault, Habermas, and post-modernists
have been at least partly assimilated into the Anglo-American
tradition. Yet if one adopts a global perspective, this heritage is
vulnerable to criticism as being quite narrow and "parochial" on three
main grounds.
First, nearly all Anglo-American legal theorists, including
those who claim to be doing general jurisprudence, work exclusively
within the Western legal tradition. Their perspective is generally
secular and they pay little if any attention to religions other than
Christianity and to non-Western cultures and traditions.
Second, and related to this, almost all Western jurisprudence
has focused on state law, especially that of sovereign, industrialized
nation-states. However, as I argue in Part IID, in many countries and
transnationally, various forms of law, religious, customary,
traditional, or normative orderings emerging from self-regulation or
commercial practice, may be as important, if not more important, than
municipal law in some contexts.
Third, and most important for a global perspective, the
agenda of mainstream Anglo-American jurisprudence seems quite
limited. It has concentrated, sometimes obsessively, on a narrow
range of issues, most of which seem generally remote from the
concerns of world leaders and Southern peoples. From a global
perspective, questions need to be asked about the actual and potential
contribution of law and legal theory to pressing problems of the age,
such as the North-South Divide, war, genocide, and the environment,
Barnett, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined - Again!, 15 LEGAL STUD.
88 (1995) (also covering Australia and Canada). Ronald Dworkin remarks that
"[c]ontemporary jurisprudence courses differ wildly in content ... There is no
single subject, technique or canon." Ronald Dworkin, Hart and the Concepts of
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 95, 96 (2006). This may be true of jurisprudence
courses, especially in the United States, but there is a mainstream and there is far
less variety in books for such courses as is illustrated by the three surveys
referred to above.
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or those identified at the Millennium Summit, including hunger,
poverty, basic education, health, international and national security,
colonialism, fundamentalism, displaced persons, fair trade, and
corruption. 12 From this point of view, our heritage can look rather
narrow and sterile, narrow in its concerns, ignorant of other traditions,
and ethnocentric in its biases. In short, despite the richness and
complexity of our heritage, from a global perspective we are
collectively open to charges of myopia, ignorance, ethnocentrism, and
irrelevance. The central argument of this paper contends that both the
practices and discipline of law are in fact becoming more
cosmopolitan, and that jurisprudence as the theoretical part of law as a
discipline needs to face these challenges.
In Globalisation and Legal Theory I argued that
"globalization" presents three specific challenges to traditional legal
theory:
a. it challenges 'black box theories' that treat
nation states, societies, legal systems, and
legal orders as closed, impervious entities that
can be studied in isolation;
b. it challenges the idea that the study of law and
legal theory can be restricted to two types of
legal ordering: municipal state law and public
international law, conceived as dealing with
relations between sovereign states; and
c. it challenges the adequacy of much of the
present conceptual framework and vocabulary
of legal discourse (both law talk and talk about
law) for discussing legal phenomena across
jurisdictions, traditions, and cultures.' 3
Part II of this paper seeks to clarify, and in part modify, this
general thesis with reference to four issues that are regularly raised
in discussion when presented. And then in Part III, I shall try to
concretize the idea of a revived general jurisprudence with a few
specific examples.
12 On possible agendas, see infra Part III.
13 Quoted from TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 252.
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11A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "GLOBALIZATION"
I teach a course called "Globalization and Law." At our first
meeting I usually ban all "g-words" from the classroom - "global,"
"globalizing, .... globalization," etc. There are two exceptions to this
rule: first, for most of the course we adopt a global perspective;
second, a student may use a "g-word" provided she can justify its use
in that particular context and show that she can use it with clarity and
precision.
I have two reasons for this rule. The first is obvious: "g-
words" are ambiguous and tend to be used very loosely. They are
abused and over-used in many ways, often as part of generalizations
that are false, exaggerated, misleading, meaningless, superficial,
ethnocentric, or a combination thereof.14 I hear these problems in
much of the loose talk about global law, global governance, global
law firms and so on.
15
The second reason is especially important for lawyers: the
literature on globalization tends to move from the very local (or the
national) straight to the global, leaving out all intermediate levels. 6 It
is also tempting to assume that different levels of relations and of
14 Twining, A Cosmopolitan Discipline?, supra note 4, at 24-26.
15 Not all such talk is inflated. For example, Harold Berman makes a sustained
case for developing "world law" underpinning global civil society along the
lines of Wilfred Jenks' vision of a common law of mankind or a new ius
gentium. See Harold Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617 (1995);
see also generally C. WILFRED JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND (1958).
While I would place much greater stress on sub-global processes and
institutions, the argument deserves to be taken seriously. Similarly, the New
York University Law School's program and concerns are sufficiently extensive
that it may be pedantic to mock its claim to be "a" or "the' ''Global Law
School." However, a law firm with offices in less than ten metropolitan centers
and many books, journals, and articles with "global" in the title illustrate the
general point.
16 This is very common. See, e.g., David Westbrook, Theorizing the Diffusion of
Law: Conceptual Difficulties, Unstable Imaginations, and the Effort to Think
Gracefully Nonetheless, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 489 (2006). Even Santos, who
emphasizes the complexities of "globalization," only tends to use only four
levels: global, regional, national, and local. See, e.g., BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA
SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALISATION AND
EMANCIPATION 162-182 (2d ed. 2002) (placing the local and the global in
counterpoint) [hereinafter TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE]; cf at 371
(showing a bit more flexible chart).
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ordering are neatly nested in a hierarchy of concentric circles ranging
from the very local, through sub-state, regional, continental,
North/South, global, and beyond to outer space. The picture,
however, is much more complicated than that: it includes empires,
alliances, coalitions, diasporas, networks, trade routes, and
movements; "sub-worlds" such as the common law world, the Arab
world, the Islamic world, and Christendom; special groupings of
power such as the G7, the G8, NATO, the European Union, the
Commonwealth, multi-national corporations, crime syndicates, and
other non-governmental organizations and networks. Talking in
terms of vertical hierarchies obscures such complexities.
Even with these crude geographical categorizations, and even
without reference to history, a ban on g-words sends a simple
message of complexity. It also emphasizes the point that in regard to
the complex processes that are making individuals, groups and
peoples more interdependent, much of the transnationalization of law
and legal relations is taking place at sub-global levels. Furthermore,
there are also local and transnational relations and processes that to a
greater or lesser extent by-pass the state, such as the Internet,
networks of NGOs, many of the internal and external relations of
large corporations, and so on.
The purpose of this ban on "g-words" does not suggest that
the processes that are loosely subsumed under "globalization" are
unimportant; rather it suggests that if we adopt a global perspective in
studying and theorizing about law, our attention needs to be focused
on all levels of relations and ordering, not just the obvious trilogy of
global, regional, and nation-state, important as these may be.
I have written at length about some of the implications of
broadly conceived "globalization" for legal theory. 17  I shall not
attempt to go over that ground again here, except to make two points
that are directly relevant to this paper. Both relate to law as an
academic discipline as it has been institutionalized in what is loosely
called "the West."
In the past 150 years or so, the primary focus of academic
law, legal scholarship, legal education, and legal theory has been on
the municipal law of nation-states. This is true not only of
substantive and procedural law, but also of satellite subjects.
17 See TWINING, GLT, supra note 1; see also Twining, HCWT, supra note 1.
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Comparative law, at least until recently, has been almost entirely
dominated by "the Country and Western Tradition," a tradition
largely concerned with comparisons of private municipal law in
"parent" common law and civil law systems.' 8 The more expansive
"Grandes Systmes" tradition has often been dismissed as unscholarly
or simplistic.' 9 In legal theory, only exceptionally have Western
jurists looked beyond municipal law: in the Anglo-American tradition
nearly all canonical jurists, positivists, and non-positivists alike, from
Bentham and Austin through to Dworkin, Raz, and Duncan Kennedy,
have been concerned with domestic state law. The few exceptions,
such as Ehrlich, Maine, and Llewellyn,2 ° are generally treated as
marginal. In recent times, leading normative theorists, notably Rawls
and Dworkin, have explicitly retreated into a peculiar kind of
particularism. Dworkin states that "interpretive theories are by their
nature addressed to a particular legal culture, generally the culture to
which their authors belong." 21 Rawls makes a similar restriction to
liberal, or at least decent, societies;22 even socio-legal studies and
sociology of law for most of their history have focused almost
entirely on the municipal law of their own "societies.
23
18 See William Twining, Comparative Law and Legal Theory: The Country and
Western Tradition in Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 21-76 (Ian Edge ed., 2000).
19 See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 1-9 (2d ed. 1993).
20 American commentators tend to focus on Llewellyn as a legal realist and
commercial lawyer, but downplay the significance of "the law jobs theory,"
which is treated as perhaps his most significant contribution by European jurists.
See, e.g., RECHTREALISMUS, MULTIKULTURELLE GESELLSCHAFT UND
HANDELSRECHT: KARL N. LLEWELLYN UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG HEUTE (Ulrich
Drobnig & Manfred Rehbinder eds., 1994).
21 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 102 (1986).
22 "The aims of political philosophy depend on the society it addresses." John
Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus (1987), reprinted in COLLECTED
PAPERS 421-448, 421 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
23 On the declining value of the idea of a "society" as an analytical concept, see
ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 64 (1990); see also
TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 206-8 (going so far
as to say that "society" is no longer a useful concept for the sociology of law and
substitutes the more flexible "social arena").
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Similar patterns are discernible in Continental Europe. The
phenomenon is familiar, well documented, unsurprising, and for the
most part, quite easily explained. One general reason is that,
especially in the common law tradition, the culture of academic law is
"participant-oriented" and, at least until recently, professional legal
training and practice (by judges, government lawyers, as well as
private practitioners) have been almost entirely oriented to local
municipal law. In the present context, an important implication of
this is that nearly all of our stock of concepts and theories remain
relatively local or at least geared to a single legal tradition. Indeed,
nearly all legal concepts, including many "fundamental legal
conceptions" that have been the focus of analytic jurists' attention, are
"folk concepts." 24  Hence, one of the main challenges to general
analytic jurisprudence involves the elucidation and construction of
analytical concepts that "travel well" across legal traditions and
cultures.25
Secondly, the adoption of a global perspective may encourage
reductionist tendencies such as the search for universals, the
construction of grand overarching theories, and the tendency to
emphasize similarity rather than difference. Such tendencies are
particularly visible in the movement to harmonize, standardize, and
unify laws. 26 In 1977, the World Congress on Philosophy of Law and
Social Philosophy was launched under the grand rubric of "A General
Theory of Law for the Modern Age." No such theory resulted. My
contribution, entitled "The Great Juristic Bazaar," was taken as
satirizing this title and emphasized the richness, pluralism, and
24 On the shortness of the list of concepts dealt with by nineteenth century
analytical jurists, see TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 17-18, 22-23. On the
distinction between "folk" and "analytic" concepts, see Twining, PWCL, supra
note 1, at 229-31.
25 This is the central theme of Twining, HCWT, supra note 1. See generally H.
PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 44-51 (2d ed. 2004)
(discussing some of the methodological difficulties).
26 A powerful eloquent critique of the tendency to privilege the similar over the
different is made by Pierre Legrand in PIERRE LEGRAND & RODERICK MUNDAY,
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 240-311 (2003).
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complexity of the global heritage of theorizing about law.27 Although
I am not an extreme particuralist, a central theme of theorizing
envisaged in this paper is that problems of generalizing about legal
phenomena - conceptually, normatively, empirically, and legally - are
central problems of a new general jurisprudence.
I have one major exception to the ban on "g-words." I
encourage students to adopt a global perspective as a starting point for
considering particular topics in the course. 28 Thinking in terms of
total pictures assists in setting a context for more particular studies.
29
Glenn's work on legal traditions and Tamanaha's attempt to construct
a broad and inclusive general concept of law are good examples of the
synthesizing function of legal theory. 30  There may even be some
modest value in trying to construct a historical atlas of law in the
world as a whole. Earlier attempts to construct such maps, however,
did little more than illustrate the difficulties: the variety of "levels" of
human relations and ordering, the problems of individuating
normative and legal orders, the complexity and elusiveness of the
subject matters of our discipline, and the relatively undeveloped state
of the stock of concepts and data that would be needed to produce
such overviews. 31 Adopting a global perspective also reminds us
27 William Twining, Academic Law and Legal Philosophy: The Significance of
Herbert Hart, 95 LAW Q. REV. 557 (1979), reprinted in TWINING, GJB, supra
note 1, at 69.
28 Adopting a global perspective is not "a view from nowhere." For example,
this article explicitly adopts the standpoint of an English jurist based in London
and Florida, considering some of the implications of adopting a global
perspective for his conception of legal theory and for law as an institutionalized
discipline.
29 This is the development of the second part of Llewellyn's realist precept: "See
it fresh, see it whole, see it as it works." William Twining, Talk About Realism,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 376 (1985), reprinted in TWINING, GJB, supra note 1, at
140-42 (paraphrasing Llewellyn in KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 510 (1960)).
30 TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 206-08; see also
GLENN, supra note 25.
31 See TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 136-73; (presenting the idea of "mapping
law"); cf Gordon Woodman, Why There Can Be No Map of Law, in LEGAL
PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL LAW IN SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT (Rajendra Pradham ed., 2003) (discussing the "impossibility" of
mapping law).
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about our collective ignorance of other legal traditions. Despite
advancements toward a more cosmopolitan discipline, attention will
remain primarily focused on particular inquiries 32 and local details.
Jurists and legal scholars cannot live by abstractions alone.
In summation, we may not be able to entirely expunge g-
words from our vocabulary because some genuinely global issues and
phenomena exist. Since g-discourse tends to be both narrow in range
and quite rigid, a global perspective may be useful for setting a broad
context and presenting overviews and maps. Therefore, whenever we
hear a g-word, we should pause to ask: is it being used precisely, or in
this context is it exaggerated, superficial, misleading, simplistic,
ethnocentric, false, or just plain meaningless?
1iB. "GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE"
Similar considerations apply to the term "general
jurisprudence" as to the overuse of the term "global." "General" in
this context has at least four different meanings: (a) abstract, as in
"thorie g~n~rale du droit;" (b) universal, at all times in all places; (c)
32 The connection between secularism and human rights provides a striking
example of the implications of adopting a global perspective. Many Western
scholars treat human rights discourse as a product of Enlightenment secular
rationalism. See, e.g., FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES FOR A GODLESS AGE: THE
STORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS (2000); CONOR
GEARTY, 2005 HAMLYN LECTURES: CAN HUMAN RIGHTS SURVIVE? (2006); cf
UPENDRA BAXI, HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION 18 (2002) ("[H]uman rights
education symbolizes a secular, or multi-religious equivalent of 'liberation
theology."'). Such interpretations of human rights theory and discourse may be
generally correct from a European perspective, but are more problematic in the
Unites States. From a global perspective, however, it is at least as plausible to
characterize our age as one of religious revival, not only in respect of Islam.
These revivals are not confined to non-Western countries, not least because of
patterns of immigration. See, e.g., PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM:
THE COMING OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY (2002) (discussing the power of
demographic trends and religion); cf RELIGION AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: REVIVAL OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IN EAST AND WEST
(Bronislaw Misztal & Anson Skupe eds., 1992) (comparing Christian religious
movements in Eastern and Western Europe and the United States). Examples of
the revival and reform in Islam are presented in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
ISLAM (John L. Esposito ed., 1999) passim. The growing Yoruba diaspora is
discussed in ORISA: YORUBA RELIGION AND CULTURE IN AFRICA AND THE
DIASPORA (Wande Abimbola & Kola Abimbola eds., forthcoming 2006).
[Vol. 15:1
GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE
widespread, geographically or over time; (d) more than one, up to
infinity.
The English distinction between general and particular
jurisprudence is not quite the same as the one common usage found in
Continental Europe. In his useful book, What is Legal Theory?, Mark
van Hoecke traces the history of civilian conceptions of "general
jurisprudence" (th~orie g~nkrale du droit, algemeine rechtlehre) in
terms of the ups and downs of a sub-discipline that tried to establish
itself between abstract legal philosophy and legal dogmatics.33 This
kind of legal theory reached its heyday before World War II in the
Revue Internationale de la thorie du droit edited by Kelsen, Duguit
and Weyr. In this interpretation, "legal philosophy" was abstract and
metaphysically removed from the details of actual legal systems.
"General jurisprudence" was empirical, concerned with analyzing
actual legal systems at a relatively high level of generality. "General"
in this context therefore refers to a level of abstraction rather than to
geographical reach, and "general jurisprudence" is interpreted as a
kind of middle order theory.
In the English analytical tradition, "general" referred to an
extension in a point of space: Bentham, for example, distinguished
between universal and local jurisprudence; Austin between the
general theory of law common to more mature systems and the theory
of law underlying a particular legal system. Accordingly, we need to
distinguish between "generality" in respect of levels of abstraction, in
respect of geographical reach, and in respect of extent. Mobile
phones and the Internet have wide geographical reach without being
very abstract; mobile phones are numerous; the Dutch concept of
"beleid," as I dimly understand it, is quite abstract but rather local.34
Often, however, generalization involves abstraction.
During the nineteenth century, English jurists normally
assumed that jurisprudence was general. The Natural Law Tradition
33 See generally M. VAN HOECKE, WHAT IS LEGAL THEORY? (1986).
34 See ERHARD BLANKENBURG & FREEK BRUINSMA, DUTCH LEGAL CULTURE
63-73 (2d. ed. 1994). Beleid is "a very Dutch legal term," which has no English
equivalent. Id. at 63. It is considered a key to understanding Dutch legal
culture. "It is generally used to describe the policies of a public body" in terms
of intentions, guidelines, ethos, or standards by which its actions may be judged.
Id. It is used in the text as an example of an abstract term which has a limited
geographical reach.
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was universalistic. Bentham developed a universal science of
legislation. Austin, more cautiously, developed a general analytical
jurisprudence for more mature nations. Holland claimed that
jurisprudence was a science and therefore must be general. Leaders
of the Historical School, such as Maine, advanced sweeping
Darwinian generalizations about law and social change.35 However,
during the early days of academic law in both England and the United
States, the focus became more particular. One reason for this was that
the study of the fundamental legal conceptions of one's own legal
system was viewed as more practical and relevant to the rest of the
curriculum. Austin, Pollock, Gray, and others explicitly emphasized
this practicality. 36 There were also signs of a tacit legal relativism as
exemplified by W.W. Buckland.37
Nineteenth century proponents of general jurisprudence,
influenced by scientific models of enquiry (e.g., Darwinism) and by
universalism in ethics (e.g., both utilitarianism and natural law),
tended to assume the universality of their theories. Today, however,
claims to universality and generality need to be treated as
problematic. A central issue of a revived general jurisprudence
should be: how far is it meaningful, feasible, and desirable to
generalize (conceptually, normatively, empirically, and legally)
across legal traditions and cultures? To what extent are legal
phenomena contextually and culturally specific? In treating
generalization as problematic, usage may be the most useful because
of its flexibility.
While Bentham and some nineteenth century jurists equated
"general" with "universal, 3 8 Austin and others explicitly limited their
35 For details, see TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 15-49.
36 See J. AUSTIN, THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (1863) reprinted
in JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, ETC. (H.L.A
Hart ed. 1954); FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS
1-41 (1882); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW
128-144 (1909).
37 See GRAY, supra note 36, at 132.
38 Tamanaha's conception of "general jurisprudence" is universalistic in
tendency: "The ability to gather information on all kinds of social arenas, on all
state legal systems as well as on other kinds of law, is precisely what qualifies
this proposal as a general jurisprudence." TAMANAHA, A GENERAL
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at 232-33 (emphasis in original).
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theories to "mature" or "advanced" societies. The same can be seen
by Hart and his followers who by implication treat modem state law
as the paradigm case of law. The geographical reach of much
contemporary juristic discourse is strikingly indeterminate.39
"General," in a sense, is a flexible, relative category in a way that
"global" and "universal" are not.40
In the nineteenth century the term "particular jurisprudence"
referred to the study of the concepts and presuppositions of a single
legal system. General jurisprudence referred to the study of two or
more legal systems and was quite often confined to advanced or
"civilized" systems. Universal jurisprudence was more like global
jurisprudence, although often restricted to the law of sovereign nation
states. Generality and particularity are relative matters. Globalization
has implications for law and its study. It does not follow that what is
needed is a global jurisprudence if that means looking at law solely or
mainly from a global perspective. That is too narrow. The old term
"general jurisprudence" is broader and more flexible than "global."
Here, I shall use "general jurisprudence" to refer to the theoretical
study of two or more legal traditions, cultures, or orders (including
ones within the same legal tradition or family)41 from the micro-
comparative to the universal.42
Why do I talk of "reviving" general jurisprudence when some
prominent contemporary jurists, such as Hart and Raz, claim to be
doing "general jurisprudence? 43 A brief answer is that while much
of their work can be treated as examples of general jurisprudence,
39 TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 38-47. For example, it is sometimes difficult
to be sure whether Dworkin's theory of adjudication is about American Federal
law, U.S. law, Anglo-American law, "the common law" generally, or beyond
that.
40 TWINING, GJB, supra note 1, at 338-41.
41 This paper is mainly concerned with theorizing across legal traditions and
cultures. However, comparison and generalization within a given legal tradition
or culture can also be problematic and has tended to be neglected by
comparative lawyers. On comparative common law, see id. at 145-48.
42 This conception has some affinity with nineteenth century usage, but differs
from it in three important respects: (i) it treats generalizing about legal
phenomena as problematic; (ii) it deals with all levels of legal ordering, not just
municipal and public international law; and (iii) it treats the phenomena of
normative and legal pluralism as central to jurisprudence.
4' This paragraph is adapted from TWINING, GJB, supra note 1, at 340 n. 11.
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their conception of "general jurisprudence" is quite narrow and
largely confined to state law viewed from an essentially Western
perspective. My conception is much broader than theirs and harks
back to a time when jurists as different as Bentham, Austin, Maine,
Holland, and followers of Natural Law were all conceived of as
pursuing different aspects of "jurisprudence." The label itself is
unimportant, although it has sometimes been misused. Furthermore,
contemporary jurists who consistently study general jurisprudence are
exceptional, for the great bulk of legal theorizing in the Anglo-
American tradition is confined to modem Western state legal systems,
especially the United States and the United Kingdom. Finally, my
conception of general jurisprudence is intended to challenge
tendencies (often latent) and to project parochial or ethnocentric
preconceptions onto non-Western legal orders, cultures, and
traditions.
I1c. JURISPRUDENCE, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, AND SOCIO-LEGAL
STUDIES
"Jurisprudence," "legal theory," and "legal philosophy" do
not have settled meanings in either the Anglo-American or the
Continental European traditions. 4 Here, I shall treat jurisprudence
and legal theory as synonyms and legal philosophy as one part - the
most abstract part - of jurisprudence. In this view, jurisprudence acts
as the theoretical part of law as a discipline with a number of
functions to perform in order to contribute to its health. A theoretical
question is no more and no less than a question posed at a relatively
high level of abstraction. Some topics, such as theories of justice,
questions of metaphysics, epistemology, or meta-ethics, belong to
legal philosophy in this restricted sense. Some questions, such as
"what constitutes a valid and cogent argument on a question of law in
the context of adjudication?" are in part philosophical, as they
concern themselves with the nature of reasoning, but they also
involve elements about which philosophers have no special expertise
- such as the distinction between questions of law and questions of
44 For fuller treatment, see Twining, The Province of Jurisprudence Re-
examined, supra note 1.
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fact, and the nature of adjudication.45 One cannot just take for
granted that courts and judges are institutionalized in the same ways
in London and New York, or Chicago and Amsterdam, let alone in
the world as a whole.46 One does not expect philosophers to
contribute very much to clarifying such matters, yet theories of
adjudication and legislation are an important part of the agenda of
jurisprudence.
Herbert Hart wrote that "no very firm boundaries divide the
problems confronting [different branches of legal science] from the
problems of the philosophy of law." 47  He continued: "Little,
however, is to be gained from elaborating the traditional distinctions
between the philosophy of law, jurisprudence (general and particular),
and legal theory. 4 8 I agree with the first statement, but dissent from
the second for several reasons. First, there has been a tendency in
recent times to treat legal philosophy and jurisprudence as co-
extensive, but this is associated with a tendency to focus only on the
most abstract questions and to neglect other important, but less
abstract issues. Similarly, there has been a tendency to criticize all
jurists at the level of philosophy. 49 However, by no means are all
questions in legal theory solely or mainly philosophical questions and
not all jurists are philosophers.
45 As we descend a ladder of abstraction, the need for local knowledge increases.
For example: "What constitutes a valid, cogent, and appropriate argument in
common law/US/Florida adjudication?" requires more detailed knowledge of the
institutional and cultural contexts, even more so if the question refers to a
specific court (e.g., Federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) or an
individual judge or a particular case.
46 Courts, adjudication, and judges are all problematic as analytic concepts.
TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 64; see also, MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A
COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981) (in which Shapiro bravely
attempts to develop a general account of adjudication).
4' H.L.A. Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 271 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
48 Id. In the postscript to Herbert Hart's THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994), Hart
revived the distinction between particular and general jurisprudence in order to
differentiate his expertise from Dworkin. In my view, he did not succeed. See
TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 33-47.
49 See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Is there an 'American' Jurisprudence?, 17 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 367 (1997) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
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The idea of "philosophically interesting" questions and
concepts can build bridges between law and philosophy by pointing to
shared concerns; but it can also divert attention from concepts and
issues that are jurisprudentially significant.50 Justice, rights, rules,
causation, and reasons are familiar examples of concepts that are both
jurisprudentially important and philosophically interesting. Tradition,
culture, institution, corruption, and torture may be potentially
philosophically interesting, but have not received the attention they
deserve within jurisprudence. There are, however, other concepts that
could benefit from the methods of conceptual elucidation developed
by analytical philosophers even if they do not raise issues of
philosophical significance, such as lawyer, dispute, court, jurisdiction,
and unmet legal needs.5 In the enterprise of understanding law, it is
neither necessary nor sufficient for an issue to be philosophically
interesting for it to be jurisprudentially interesting.5 2
The revival of close contacts between jurisprudence and
analytical philosophy in the 1950s, for which Herbert Hart has been
given much of the credit, has led to a range of work that has
contributed much to the enterprise of understanding law. In addition
to Hart's own work in both general and particular (or special)
jurisprudence, his immediate successors included several substantial
figures, of whom Dworkin, Finnis, MacCormick, and Raz are the best
known. Although some of the debates about positivism seem to have
verged on obsession and have recently descended to unseemly
wrangling, Brian Leiter has reminded us of the contributions of the
next generation of analytical philosophers to a wide range of topics.
5 3
50 TWINING, GJB, supra note 1, at 81-83.
51 For example, problems of constructing suitable analytic categories for
comparing legal professions and legal education have bedeviled discussions of
these subjects. At an even more mundane level it seems likely that the
underdevelopment of global and international statistics on legal phenomena is in
part due to lack of stable concepts suitable for this purpose. See TWINING, GLT,
supra note 1, at 153-57.
52 For a recent example of the use of the idea of "philosophically interesting"
that is criticized here, see Dworkin, supra note 11.
53 Brian Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil.
(Fall 2002), at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/lawphil-
naturalism/. Leiter lists criminal law theory, the conceptual and moral
foundations of private law, the elucidation of central concepts of abstract legal
theory (such as authority, reasons, rules and conventions); the revival of natural
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In the fifty years since Hart's seminal inaugural lecture, there
is much to celebrate, not only in terms of an extensive and
sophisticated literature, but also because there is now a lively,
loosely-knit interdisciplinary community that includes philosophers
interested in law, jurists interested in one or more areas of philosophy,
scholars trained in both disciplines, and philosophers who have
worked to acquire sufficient local legal knowledge to be accepted as
honorary jurists. Thus a large, well-equipped, and varied pool of
talent exists to tackle a fresh range of issues.
Despite its many achievements, a sense of dissatisfaction has
grown in recent years in regard to the dominant mode of analytical
legal philosophy both within and outside its somewhat closed circles.
This is a complex matter because the criticisms come from different
quarters, the reasons for them are varied, and some of the more heated
polemics have taken the form of personal attacks. Here, I shall
confine myself to two common complaints: (i) that legal philosophy
has become too detached from ordinary legal scholarship and legal
practice; and (ii) that mainstream analytical philosophers address their
agenda of issues too narrowly. 54  I shall argue that while these
criticisms have some force, there are encouraging signs that we are
entering a new era.
i. Legal philosophy out of touch with legal scholarship and
legal practice
This charge relates mainly to the continuing debates about
positivism - especially the Hart-Dworkin debate and the discussions
provoked by Hart's postscript to The Concept of Law. Many law
students have complained that there seems to be little or no
connection between legal philosophy and other subjects in the
law theory; and the exploration of the implications of philosophy of language,
metaphysics, and epistemology for both traditional issues of legal philosophy
and for fresh explorations of the foundations of various fields of substantive and
adjective law. Id. One might add a wealth of literature on the borderland of
legal and political theory, especially in theorizing liberal democracy and justice,
and some outstanding contributions to intellectual history, not least in relation to
Bentham.
54 These complaints are illustrated in the series of outbursts by Dworkin, infra
note 56, at 1656; Leiter, infra note 61, at 165; and Halprin, infra note 62, at 67-
68.
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curriculum. Similarly, many legal scholars complain that they find
little illumination for their particular studies from such theorizing. In
this view, much legal philosophy has become too abstract, too
esoteric, and perhaps too sophisticated to contribute much to the
health of the discipline. In short, analytical legal philosophy has
become a subject apart.
Some of these concerns found expression in a stinging attack
by Ronald Dworkin on recent positivist writings, exemplified by Jules
Coleman and Joseph Raz. 56 His central charge is that "positivists are
drawn to their conception of law not for its inherent appeal, but
because it allows them to treat legal philosophy as an autonomous,
analytic, and self-contained discipline. '57 He also charges that "[t]hey
make little attempt to connect their philosophy of law either to
political philosophy generally or to substantive legal practice,
scholarship, or theory. '' 58 To Dworkin, this kind of work is insular,
ascetic, Ptolemaic, and analogous to Scholastic philosophy. 59 He
contrasts this unworldly and sterile activity with "the decidedly
plodding and terrestrial character of what I actually said.",
61
In an equally sharp riposte, no less personal because the
author disclaims having met him, Brian Leiter writes Dworkin off as
wrong-headed, deeply implausible, and largely irrelevant to some
lively areas of legal philosophy that Dworkin has ignored.61
Dworkin, in turn, accuses positivist legal philosophers, such
as Coleman and Raz, of having lost touch with legal scholarship and
legal practice. In a thoughtful essay entitled "Thirty Years Off the
Point," Andrew Halpin agrees with the thrust of Dworkin's critique
and extends it to Leiter in respect of divorce from practice, but then
55 See Neil MacCormick & William Twining, Theory in the Law Curriculum
(1986), reprinted in TWINING, LIC, supra note 8, at 131-148.
56 Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1656 (2002)
(reviewing JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001), where Coleman attacked
Dworkin).
57 Id. at 1656.
58 Id. at 1678.
59 id.
6°Id. at 1687.
61 Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21 st
Century, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 165, 165-66, 180 (2004).
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goes on to argue that Dworkin is no more in touch with legal practice
than his rivals.62 The central point is that Dworkin and Raz have each
elected to emphasize only one characteristic of legal practice in a way
which does not give an account of actual practice, but "is rather a
theoretical perspective on what law might be if one were to share the
theorist's preoccupations.
'
"
63
The effect of these sharp exchanges reveals more than their
intellectual content. They can be interpreted as symptomatic of a
growing feeling that some enclaves of legal philosophy have fallen
into a rut and therefore need to branch out in new directions. Part of
my argument is that the challenges of globalization present plenty of
opportunities to do just that.
62 See Andrew Halpin, The Methodology of Jurisprudence: Thirty Years Off the
Point, 19 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 67 (2006).
63 Id. at 85.
Dworkin's choice of the characteristic of deploying normative
argument clearly avoids Raz's particular error but in a more
subtle way he makes the same mistake of grounding the
methodology for his theory on an artificially isolated
characteristic of the practice of law. Whereas Raz precluded
the controversies of practice from his theoretical enterprise by
insisting on a methodology that avoided engaging in moral
argument, Dworkin is open to normative or moral argument.
However, Dworkin too precludes the controversies of practice.
He does this by diverting his methodology to construct a
theory of normative argument that will provide authoritative
and conclusive reasons for recognizing particular
determinations of social relations: producing a coherent theory
to account for the 'right answer' in every established and
future case. Dworkin's enterprise is equally speculative in
working towards a theory of law that would provide an
authoritative determination of every instance of every social
relation, which is as far removed in another direction from the
actual practice of law as Raz's enterprise. Raz departs from
the controversies of practice for a theoretical exposition of law
without moral controversy; Dworkin departs for a theoretical
destination where all moral controversy is resolved.
Id. at 86. I am in sympathy with the thrust of Halpin's criticism, but I have
some puzzlements about his conception of "legal practice."
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ii. Narrowness
Charges of narrowness against analytical jurisprudence are of
long standing. They can refer to focus, conception of law, or
geographical reach. All three are relevant in the present context.
The central thesis of this paper is that as the discipline of law
becomes more cosmopolitan, the theoretical part of jurisprudence
needs to broaden its reach to take more account of non-Western legal
traditions, a wider range of legal phenomena, and different levels of
normative and legal relations and ordering.
For many years I have argued that Herbert Hart and his
followers revolutionized the methods of analytical jurisprudence, but
they also tended to accept uncritically the agenda of the questions
they inherited, which in turn was based on a narrow conception of law
that centered on legal doctrine and its presuppositions.6 4 Although
they treated law as a social phenomenon, their work proceeded "in
almost complete isolation from contemporary social theory and from
work in socio-legal studies, with little overt concern with the law in
action. As an example of this, Hart himself continued to focus
almost entirely on concepts of legal doctrine or its presuppositions
("law talk") but paid almost no attention to concepts of "talk about
law," such as dispute, function, institution, order, and so on, which
were as susceptible to and in need of the same kind of conceptual
elucidation.
66
I have sometimes suggested that the famous claim that The
Concept of Law was an essay in descriptive sociology can be
interpreted as an olive branch offered by Hart to socio-legal studies.67
Recently, Nicola Lacey and David Sugarman have persuaded me that
this interpretation is historically incorrect because Hart shared the
Oxford prejudice against sociology for most of his career.68  The
64 See TWiNING, GJB, supra note 1, at 69-92; cf William Twining, Schauer on
Hart, 119 HARV. L. REv. F. 122, 128-30 (2006).
65 TWINING, GJB, supra note 1, at 73.
66 Id. at 90-91.
67 See TWINING, LIC, supra note 8, at 168-69; Twining, HCWT, supra note 1, at
n. 27.
68 NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE
DREAM 230-31, 260-61, 322 (2004); David Sugarman, Hart Interviewed: H.L.A.
Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman, 32 J.L. & SOC'Y 267, 291-93
(2005); In some contexts, terms like "Sociology of Law," "Sociological
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argument is nevertheless analytically correct, for conceptual
elucidation is as important for social scientific investigation as it is for
legal exposition, and the methods of conceptual analysis developed by
analytical philosophy are applicable to important concepts in socio-
legal studies and the social sciences generally.
Recently, Nicola Lacey has advanced a more fundamental
explanation of the narrow focus of most contemporary analytical legal
philosophy.69 Hart's conception of his enterprise came from working
"within a philosophical community . . . that conceived its own
boundaries narrowly." 70 Hart treated philosophical questions as quite
distinct from historical and sociological ones and rejected any idea of
continuity between them. He remained relatively unmoved by
historical and sociological criticisms of The Concept of Law because
he thought that these raised different questions from those that he had
set out to answer. As a result, "the social fact" dimensions of The
Concept of Law were imperfectly realized. Joseph Raz and others
followed Hart in trying to maintain a sharp distinction between
Jurisprudence," "Law and Society," and "Socio-legal Studies" may suggest that
the main, or even the only, important relationship between law and social
science is with sociology. That is quite wrong. For example, in the United
Kingdom the term "socio-legal studies" was originally coined for bureaucratic
purposes to designate those kinds of cross-disciplinary enquiries about law that
qualified for support from public funds in respect of research that involved
perspectives, methods, or concepts from any of the social sciences. Each of
these disciplines has its own complex history, culture, feuds, traditions, external
relations, and fashions. Their relations to law are correspondingly complex. On
the whole, such points have been well understood by those involved in socio-
legal research, but this diversity has sometimes been obscured at the level of
theory. In circles in which sociology is held in low esteem, this conflation of
sociology and the social sciences can be a used as a not too subtle kind of put
down. See LACEY at 149-50,185, 260-1; see also Thomas Nagel, The Central
Questions, LONDON REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 3, 2005, at 27.
69 See Nicola Lacey, Analytical Jurisprudence Versus Descriptive Sociology
Revisited, 84 TEX. L. REv. 945 (2006) [hereinafter Analytical Jurisprudence].
This is a development of arguments introduced in Nicola Lacey, Philosophical
Foundations of the Common Law: Social not Metaphysical, in OXFORD ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE 17-39 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000) [hereinafter Philosophical
Foundations of the Common Law] and her biography of Hart, LACEY, supra note
68.
70 Lacey, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 69, at 953.
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philosophical and empirical questions. 7 1 As a result, they failed to
resolve the tension between emphasizing that law is a social
phenomenon and refusing to consider it empirically.
72
Lacey suggests that the dilemma of trying to theorize law as
genuinely normative yet grounded in social fact is even more acute in
the context of particular (or special) jurisprudence. In a perceptive
discussion of Causation in the Law, 73 Lacey acknowledges that this
thorough application of linguistic analysis to hundreds of cases
greatly clarified the legal concept of causation and grounded a
convincing critique of "causal minimalism" of American jurists such
as Wechsler.74 Hart and Honor6 gave a very rich account of the
discourse of causation in the law, but they gave "no systematic
analysis of the institutional, practical, professional context in which
71 Lacey attributes this to Raz's distinction between "momentary" and "non-
momentary legal systems." See JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
187-202 (1970). The identity of the latter is determined primarily by their
content and of the former by the criteria of identification of valid legal
standards. "Raz may be taken to imply that the social-theoretic analysis of law
can be neatly bracketed off from the analytic." Lacey, Analytical Jurisprudence,
supra note 69, at 981.
72 [T]he richer the characterization of law's social basis - its
institutional forms, its various types of rules, its role and its
functions - the less plausible any theoretical claim to
universality. Hart wanted to maintain the claim to universality
as well as descriptiveness. In doing so, he ended up with the
worst of both worlds. On the one hand, he produced a theory
whose commitment to a social fact dimension meant that it did
indeed reflect certain features of institutionalization - a fact
which already compromised its universality. His theory, after
all, fits most comfortably with a centralized state legal order.
On the other hand, in the grip of the ambition for universality,
he failed to deliver any rich paradigm of law's institutional
form.
Lacey, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 69, at 957-58.
73 H.L.A. HART& TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959).
74 "Causal minimalism claims that there is no sui generis concept of causation
deployed in law beyond the 'factual' idea of causation as a sine qua non ...
Beyond this ...decisions about how to attribute causal liability are based on
policy considerations such as efficiency or moral considerations such as fault."
LACEY, supra note 68, at 212.
[Vol. 15:1
GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE
the legal language was used. 75 Consequently, they gave a very thin
account of the very different social roles of contract, crime, and torts;
law was analyzed as a body of doctrine rather than as a social
practice, and as a result, "law is implicitly misrepresented as founded,
actually or ideally, on a metaphysics - that is, on a moral or
conceptual structure whose validity transcends space and time. 76
Lacey further illustrates her thesis with reference to Hart's theory of
responsibility and the social and institutional basis of corporate
criminal responsibility.
77
Two points about Lacey's argument deserve emphasis. First,
her thesis is about "a general commitment to theorizing law as a
social phenomenon, 7 8 which is separate from a more general
argument about the need to theorize law sociologically. 79 Second, her
thesis is not merely that linguistic analysis of legal discourse divorced
from its institutional and social context is incomplete, but rather that it
is misleading. If Causation in the Law had included a richer account
of the context in which legal language is used, it would have been a
quite different book:
We could expect it to have explored questions such as
the institutional factors which restrict the extent to
which judges will appeal to pragmatic or policy
arguments - their sensitivity to the need to legitimate
their decisions, their (system-specific) understanding
of their constitutional role and so on. As an empirical
matter, these institutional factors shape not only the
appeal to policy in causation cases but also the
development of causal concepts themselves.
80
7Id. at 217.
76 Lacey, Analytical Jurisprudence, supra note 69, at 981.
77 Lacey, Philosophical Foundations of the Common Law, supra note 69, at 21-
35.
71Id. at 19.
79 See Roger Cotterrell, Why Must Legal Ideas be Interpreted Sociologically?,
25 J.L. & Soc'Y 171 (1998)passim.
80 LACEY, supra note 68, at 218.
2007]
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
Lacey's critique of attempts to draw a sharp line between
philosophical and social perspectives on law elicited a sharp response
from a philosopher, Thomas Nagel:
Lacey seems to have a weak grasp of what philosophy
is. Hart's work consists not merely in analysis of
doctrinal language, but in the philosophical
elucidation of institutions, practices, concepts, and
forms of reasoning and justification that are the most
basic and general elements of law and politics. He is
acutely aware of the importance of institutions and
power relations, but the questions he addresses cannot
be answered by social and historical study .... [F]or
all philosophers, the understanding they seek has to be
pursued primarily by reasoning rather than empirical
observation, because it is concerned with concepts and
methods that enable us to describe and think about
what we can observe. These are not mutually
exclusive approaches or forms of understanding: they
address different questions, and they operate at
different levels of abstraction and generality.
8
'
Nagel takes Lacey to task for associating Hart's neglect of
institutional and practical context with differences between J. L.
Austin and Wittgenstein. He completely misses the point of her
criticism, however, which is that legal concepts and legal doctrine can
only be understood in the institutional and practical context of their
use, and that an account of causation or corporate responsibility in
English law is likely not merely to be incomplete but misleading if
these contextual factors are ignored. For the same reason, abstracted
accounts of "legal reasoning" or "adjudication" are likely to be over-
generalized or inaccurate in other ways if differences in institutional
and other contexts are overlooked. The extent to which such
contextual factors are similar or uniform - both across and within
81 Nagel, supra note 68.
82 If Lacey had implied that Wittgenstein would have actually undertaken
empirical work this would be misleading, but she denies this. Lacey, Analytical
Jurisprudence, supra note 69, at 969.
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jurisdictions - is an empirical one. Philosophers who wish to
understand legal phenomena need to equip themselves with local
knowledge.
Many of us have argued for years that law, including legal
doctrine and concepts, needs to be understood in context. Recently,
there have been encouraging signs of a convergence between socio-
legal and analytical approaches. For some time analytical
jurisprudence was treated with hostility by many who favored
contextual or socio-legal perspectives.83 The disdain was mutual.84
Recently, however, the mood has changed. Leading socio-legal
scholars, including Cotterrell, Griffiths, and Roberts, have
acknowledged that Hart's The Concept of Law has made a significant
contribution to social science. 85 Leiter has reinterpreted legal realism
in terms of naturalist philosophy, one version of which treats
conceptual analysis as continuous with empirical inquiry in the social
86sciences. Lewis Kornhauser has recently elaborated a social
scientific concept of governance structures - of which legal systems
83 Early critics of Hart from a social science perspective included Edgar
Bodenheimer, Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the Limits of its
Usefulness, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 1080 (1956) and B.E. King, The Basic Concept
of Professor Hart's Jurisprudence: The Norm Out of the Bottle, 1963
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 270 (1963). For more recent examples of hostility to analytical
positivism, see PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992)
and Morton Horwitz, Why is Anglo-American Jurisprudence Unhistorical?, 17
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 551 (1997).
84 The patronizing attitudes of Oxford philosophers towards lawyers at the time
of Hart's election to the Chair of Jurisprudence in Oxford are vividly illustrated
in LACEY, supra note 68, at 149-50. It seemed that Hart was expected to
colonize, educate, and upgrade academic law.
85 See Cotterrell, supra note 79; Simon Roberts, Against Legal Pluralism: Some
Reflections on the Contemporary Enlargement of the Legal Domain, 42 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM 95 (1998) [hereinafter Against Legal Pluralism]; Simon
Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 MOD.
L. REv. 1 (2005) [hereinafter After Government?]; and John Griffiths, The
Social Working of Legal Rules, 48 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (2003).
86 See Leiter, supra note 49; Leiter, supra note 61; and Brian Leiter, Legal
Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART'S
POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 355-370
(Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
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are a class - that explicitly takes its inspiration from Hart.87
Especially significant are Brian Tamanaha's use of Hart's positivist
premises as the starting-point for his socio-legal positivist general
jurisprudence 88 and the fact that some analytical jurists have
sympathetically reviewed Tamanaha's work. 89
liD. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NON-STATE LAW
The great bulk of mainstream Western legal theory and legal
scholarship in the twentieth century focused on the domestic law of
municipal legal systems, sometimes extending to public international
law in the narrow sense of law governing relations between states
("The Westphalian Duo"). Hart, Rawls, Kelsen, and Raz are
examples of this perspective. The main exceptions have been legal
anthropologists and other scholars who have emphasized the
importance of legal pluralism. Recently, some jurists interested in the
implications of "globalization," including Glenn, Santos, Tamanaha,
and myself, have advanced arguments in favor of broader conceptions
of law that include at least some examples of "non-state law." Not
surprisingly, this has been met with some resistance.
In the immediate context of viewing our discipline and its
subject matters from a global perspective (both geographically and
historically) my argument for a broad conception of law is that
focusing solely on the municipal law of nation states (or 'the
Westphalian Duo') leaves out too much that should be the proper
concern of legal scholarship. A reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan
discipline of law needs to encompass all levels of relations and of
87 See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Governance Structures, Legal Systems, and the
Concept of Law, 79 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 355 (2004).
88 See BRIAN TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND
A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW (1997); TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 6.
89 See, e.g., Brian Bix, Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence, 1 LEGAL
THEORY 464 (1995); and Brian Bix, Conceptual Jurisprudence and Socio-Legal
Studies, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 227 (2000). Himma recommends Tamanaha's book,
A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 6, "without
reservations, to both legal philosophers and sociologists." Kenneth Einar
Himma, Do Philosophy and Sociology Mix? A Non-Essentialist Socio-Legal
Positivist Analysis of the Concept of Law, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 717, 718
(2004); see also Twining, The Province of Jurisprudence Re-examined, supra
note 1.
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ordering, relations between these levels, and all important forms of
law including supra-state (e.g., international, regional) and non-state
law (e.g., religious law, transnational law, chthonic law, i.e.,
tradition/custom) and various forms of "soft law." A picture of law in
the world that focuses only on the municipal law of nation states and
public international law would for many purposes be much too
narrow. For example, it is difficult to justify omitting Islamic law or
other major traditions of religious law from such a picture. Yet, to
include only those examples of religious law or custom officially
recognized by sovereign states (state legal pluralism) would be
seriously misleading.90 To try to subsume European Union Law or
lex mercatoria or international commercial arbitration or all examples
of "human rights law" under public international law similarly
stretches that concept to breaking point, without any corresponding
gains.
9 1
A move to extend the conception of law to encompass the
main phenomena that are appropriately treated as subject-matters of
our discipline 92 undoubtedly raises a number of conceptual
90 It is hardly controversial to say that to recognize Islamic or other religious law
only insofar as it is recognized by sovereign states involves crude distortion. It
would be odd to accept the idea of a Jewish, Islamic or Gypsy legal tradition,
but to refuse to talk about Jewish and Islamic or Gypsy law - but that is a
corollary of thinking in terms of law as a system of rules. See generally
RELIGION, LAW AND TRADITION (Andrew Huxley ed. 2002). On the differences
between looking at Jewish legal tradition from the perspective of a theologian
and a jurist, see Bernard Jackson, Internal and External Comparisons on
Religious Law: Reflections from Jewish Law, 2 DAIMON. ANNUARIO DI DIRITTO
COMPARATO DELLA RELIGIONE 257 (2002).
9' A theory of state law such as Hart's provides an inadequate theoretical
framework for grounding our discipline as it becomes more cosmopolitan and
more concerned with multiple levels of legal relations and legal ordering. Hart's
concept of law cannot easily fit European Union Law, contemporary public
international law, religious law, canon law, and medieval and modern lex
mercatoria, let alone other forms of traditional and customary law that are
candidates for our attention as legal scholars and jurists. In short, none of our
stock of theories of municipal law can provide an adequate theoretical basis for
a cosmopolitan and reasonably inclusive discipline of law.
92 Of course "understanding law" involves understanding much else besides.
Studying law in context does not involve defining law as context. Our concern
here is with what constitute legal phenomena as the main subject matters of our
discipline. That implies some means of differentiating between legal and other
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difficulties, but that is not a good reason for retreating back to the
familiar orbit of a state law plus a few "law-like" analogies. In the
present context, the key step is to cease to treat modem municipal law
as a paradigm case by reference to which one can decide on the
closeness of the analogy of other candidates for inclusion.93 Glenn,
Tamanaha, and Griffiths, for example, in different ways de-center the
state from their pictures of law in the world without denying that it is
for most purposes the most, powerful, complex and sophisticated
form of law around. 94
The issue is not mainly a semantic one nor is it one of status, a
plea that specialists in religious legal traditions, African law or Gypsy
law, should be recognized as jurists and legal scholars. Instead, it
concerns the health of our discipline and especially our collective
ignorance and marginalization of the ideas, norms, institutions and
practices of non-Western legal traditions. My thesis in this context is
that we can no longer afford to maintain such a narrow focus, that this
involves significant redeployment of attention and resources, and that
this re-orientation of our discipline raises fundamental problems of
comparison and generalization across legal traditions, cultures and
other boundaries 95 in which we are not yet well equipped to tackle.
Some colleagues may readily concede that more attention.
needs to be paid to other legal traditions and cultures and that this has
implications for legal theory. They may also concede that if one
adopts a global perspective at the start of the twenty-first century
there are good reasons for arguing that an exclusive focus on
municipal law is too narrow for many practical and theoretical
purposes as well as, generally, for a balanced view of the subject
matters of a genuinely cosmopolitan discipline of law. But they may
phenomena, between legal and "non-legal" rules, institutions, practices, and
processes. Skepticism about a general definition of law does not involve denial
of the need to be able to make appropriate differentiations and clarifications in
given contexts.
93 See TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6.
94 GLENN, supra note 25; TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
6; John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986);
John Griffiths, The Social Working ofLegal Rules, 48 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1-83
(2003).
95 On the analytic value of the concepts of culture, tradition, civilization, and
religion, see Twining, A Fresh Start, supra note 1, at 107-08 passim.
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still be concerned about a sharp break with state-centered conceptions
of law or what Simon Roberts has called "attempts to loosen the
conceptual bonds between law and government." 96 These concerns
need to be addressed not only in relation to my specific argument but
also to broader claims about the importance of non-state law in a
variety of other contexts.
The literature on globalization is replete with discussion of the
decline of sovereignty, the changing significance of national
boundaries, religious revivals, the increase in migration and
displacement, the extension of multi-culturalism, the decline of
private international law and the rise of private transnational justice,
the importance of informal horizontal transnational networks of
officials and judges, the increasing roles of non-state actors, and so
on. The more ebullient forms of "g-talk" contain such catch-phrases
as "the end of sovereignty," "the decline of the nation state," "global
governance," and "the borderless world. 97  Clearly these
developments deserve the attention of jurists, but their significance is
contested and difficult to interpret. However, to argue that non-state
law deserves more attention from legal scholars and jurists involves
no specific commitment to a firm position on any of these
developments. Whether the nation-state is in fact declining in relative
importance is an extremely complex and elusive question, which is
usually better tackled at lower levels of generality. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to restate briefly why non-state law needs our
attention.
Patrick Glenn, among others, has made the general case for
taking non-state law seriously at some length.98 For the sake of
brevity, I shall adopt his argument. The nation state as the primary
form of governance emerged slowly in Europe, roughly between the
thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. The modem conception of a
sovereign nation state with a monopoly of legitimate authority over
96 Roberts, After Government?, supra note 85.
97 See, e.g., KENICHE OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD (1990); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
98 H. Patrick Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 839 (Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet eds. 2003);
H. Patrick Glenn, The Nationalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES,
supra note 26, at 76-99.
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defined territory has been the predominant form in the West for
barely two centuries. Even during the period, the predominant notion
was not universal:
There has been considerable correspondence between
statist legal theory and actual legal practice in Europe
and the United States, but elsewhere it has been taken
cum grano salis. States in the colonized world (the
rest of the world) lived through the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries in a delicate
equilibrium between local law (in its non-state form)
and the metropolitan law of the colonial power.
Identities here were complex and shared, law was
conceived in a pluralistic manner, state law was
necessarily limited, and conquered peoples played an
active role in the law applicable to them . . . . Law
here has been conceived for centuries in a
transnational manner.
99
Apart from variations in the power and reach of state law,
Glenn emphasizes the variety of forms in which states exist and the
lack of analytical purchase of the concept of a national legal system.
There may be nearly two hundred members of the United Nations, but
these include failed states, small states, 00 fragmented states, states
caught up in lengthy civil wars, and states with corrupt, despotic, or
anarchic regimes. In most parts of the world, the modem form of the
state, with its great variety and fluidity, is a quite recent phenomenon
with shallow roots. In the post-colonial period, and as the result of
colonialism and imperialism, the modem state's stability and
hegemony have often been challenged, through for example,
boundary disputes, civil wars, revolution and conquest.
The abstract and formalistic nature of the conception of a
nation state as the basis for membership of the United Nations
99 Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, supra note 98; see also H. Patrick
Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGILL L.J. 261, 266-68 (1987).
100 See Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, supra note 98, at 846 citing
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 492
(2000) (reporting that more that 50% of the largest economies in the world were
corporations rather than states in the 1990s).
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obscures both the diversity of kinds of states, the variation in the
extent of each state's actual effective control over its territory, and the
fragility and susceptibility to change of this political form.10'
Glenn treats nation state law as one tradition among many. In
addition to various forms of non-state law at sub-national levels, he
examines the contributions of the ius commune, the lex mercatoria,
natural law, personal laws, 'binding' custom, self-regulation, and best
practices to the development of transnational law. He links this
examination to his general thesis about tradition and persuasive
authority:
Ancient justifications for law beyond the state are
once again of relevance since transnational law is not
(generally) considered to be binding law [subject to
exceptions] . . . . Pre-state and post-state law,
however, share the general characteristic of being
suppletive law, law which is at the disposition of the
parties as opposed to binding them. The notion of
binding people together was necessary for purposes of
construction of collective identities, as in the case of
organized religion and the state.
0 2
101 "The definition of a state suggests uniformity, since all states are composed
of uniform elements, a government and a defined territory. International law
supports this impression of uniformity, since all states are treated as equal, at
least in principle. Yet, national legal traditions crystallize in many different
forms, some close to the European model, or models, others far removed from
them. Diversity emerges in the choice which the members of each state make as
to its constituent elements. The tradition of a national legal system creates no
obstacle to this, since systems are defined only in terms of ensembles with
interacting elements. That is why the notion of state is not f6conde; it is a
formal descriptor and almost anything can be conceived in terms of system.
Hence, the ubiquity of the expression 'legal system' in describing wildly
disparate legal phenomena in the world." LEGRAND AND MUNDAY, supra note
26, at 90-91; TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 178-84. Glenn's emphasis on the
diversity of states and the formal nature of the category contrasts sharply with
Simon Roberts' emphasis on the distinctiveness of state law as a form of
ordering. See infra at 42-48.
102 Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, supra note 98, at 849.
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While Patrick Glenn's account of legal traditions of the world
may be controversial, 0 3 it is the most comprehensive and persuasive
general argument for taking non-state law seriously if one adopts a
global perspective. Given that this appears to involve a quite radical
break from the dominant Western traditions of academic law, it is
hardly surprising if it gives rise to some anxieties among scholars and
jurists. Such concerns deserve to be taken seriously. Here, I shall
address four different concerns that have been expressed and will
argue that while a global perspective opens up some exciting
possibilities for our discipline, the break with tradition need not be
quite as sharp as might at first sight appear. The concerns can be
categorized into four heads: (i) A threat to liberal democracy?; (ii)
Diluting the discipline of law?; (iii) Conceptual difficulties I: the
problem of the definitional stop; (iv) Conceptual difficulties II: the
distinctiveness of state law.
i. A threat to liberal democracy?
A great deal of modem Anglo-American jurisprudence has in
recent years been focused on the development of liberal democratic
theory, as exemplified by the work of Rawls, Dworkin, Raz, and
MacCormick. This kind of political philosophy has been almost as
state-centric as legal theory.' 0 4 For much of the twentieth century,
Anglo-American jurisprudence has been concerned with a tug of war
between the minimalist/reactive state, the welfare state, and the
administrative state.
Some political scientists have noted a strong change of mood
during the 2 0 th century. There was a period in which the state was
looked upon with suspicion by the libertarian Right. Conversely, the
state was considered by the Left to provide the best hope for popular
sovereignty, social justice and the rights of the citizen. But in recent
years the predominating mood has changed to one of suspicion of
103 See Twining, A Fresh Start, supra note 1, at 100-199. "Because of its
intimate connections with the world of affairs - with legal practice and the law
in action in a broad sense - nearly all legal discourse is strongly participant-
oriented . . . . Its main audiences are actual or intending participants with
concerns related directly or indirectly to their own activities. These participants
are varied and so are their concerns." TwINING, LIC, supra note 8, at 111-12.
104 For some social scientists, however, the concept of governance extends
beyond the state to include, for example, economy, family, and community.
[Vol. 15:1
GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE
both the state and nationalism. 10 5 These tendencies have in turn bred
a fear that this suspicion will lead to anarchy, repression, and
injustice. These concerns stem from the rationale that political ideals
such as democracy, the Rule of Law, citizenship, human rights, due
process, social welfare, and social justice depend for their realization
on relatively strong and stable forms of centralized governance.
While such concerns may be well-founded, within
jurisprudence, they may not be good grounds for refusing to
acknowledge the importance of the phenomenon that a broad
conception of law would subsume under "non-state law."
Nonetheless, these concerns provide an important warning: legal
scholars should no more romanticize non-state law than they should
view state law through rose-tinted spectacles.
It is worth noting that several of those arguing for a broad
conception of law, have made a similar warning: for example, Santos
explicitly argues that "there is nothing inherently good, progressive,
or emancipatory about legal pluralism.' 0 6  Teubner criticizes the
vagueness and confusion of post-modern treatments of legal
pluralism.'0
7
Interestingly, Brian Tamanaha, having devoted a whole book
to arguing strenuously for a broad conception of law, focused almost
exclusively on state law in writing about the Rule of Law as an
105 "Associated, above all, with the impact of Foucault and his brethren, the new
prevailing sentiment on the left is anti-state, libertarian, fearful of
authoritarianism, and suspicious of collectivism .... Here I shall argue that
only a strong polity can hold out the prospect of democratic self-governance
with individual liberty and social justice; only a strong state can protect against
the disintegrative forces of global capitalism and the divisive forces of
particularism and identity." David Abraham, The Boundaries and Bonds of
Citizenship: Recognition and Redistribution in the United States, Germany, and
Israel, in 7 MIGRATION IN HISTORY 210 (Davis Center Studies in Comparative
History) (Marc Rodriguez and Anthony Grafton eds., 2007).
106 BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW,
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 114-115 (1995)
[hereinafter TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE]; SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL
COMMON SENSE, supra note 16, at 90-92.
107 Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in World Society, in
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 97, at 6-7.
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ideal.° 8 Thus, the lesson provided by the arguments of many scholars
is clear: a positivist conception of law that includes examples of non-
state law involves no commitment to approving of non-state law
whether general nor specific examples thereof. Nor does it imply that
the nation-state and democratic government are in terminal decline.
ii. Diluting the discipline of law?
A major concern of some legal scholars and educators is that
an enthusiastic response to "globalization" will result in the discipline
of law becoming detached from its roots in a particular legal tradition
and local legal practice. This concern might be expressed as follows:
Our tradition of academic law has been state-centered and rightly so
for three main reasons. First, municipal state law is by far the most
important form of normative ordering (or of law in a broad sense).
Professional lawyers, judges, government lawyers, private
practitioners, and even law-makers deal almost entirely with state
law, mainly local municipal law. They do not practice non-state law.
Second, Twining himself has argued that law is a participant-oriented
discipline closely connected in fact with legal practice in a broad
sense. 109 Third, academic law is intimately linked with preparation
for legal practice because, to a large extent, legal scholarship services
legal education. Basic competence involves mastery of practical
details and socialization into the local legal culture, especially the
intellectual skills and "mentality" of lawyers practicing within a
particular system or tradition. Even when legal education is presented
as a good vehicle for a general liberal education, the core of the
discipline is concerned with intellectual skills that involve analysis,
interpretation, application, and argumentation about detailed
particulars. Study of other traditions in perspectives courses may
have value as a secondary activity, but it usually involves study about
generalities rather than studying how to participate in a particular
legal system.' 10 Furthermore, experience has shown that the sources
108 BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 26-
35 (2004).
109 See, e.g., TWINING, LIC, supra note 8, at 111-12, 126-128.
110 See TWINING, LIC, supra note 8, at 181-83 (on the distinction between
studying about and studying how). Part of Ronald Dworkin's approach is that
his theory focuses on detailed argumentation about specific issues (especially in
hard cases) within a given system, whereas descriptive theories such as those of
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of non-state law, even when they are available, are less suitable as
vehicles for developing intellectual and practical skills than codes,
statutes, cases and other traditional materials of law study.'"
Heightened awareness of other legal traditions may be admirable, but
it is no substitute for the disciplined study of local particulars. For the
discipline of law to be internally coherent, manageable, and
disciplined it needs to continue to focus on domestic state law.
This is not the place to dwell on the complex issues about the
implications of globalization for legal education, vocational training,
and legal practice. In this context, the best I can do is confess and
avoid. I have argued elsewhere that different considerations arise in
relation to legal scholarship and legal education, for much the same
reasons that are stated in the objection.'2
However, the case for maintaining the traditional focus can
easily be overstated. Non-state law is more directly relevant to many
kinds of legal practice than is generally acknowledged. While our
Hart and Tamanaha operate at a more abstract level largely from external points
of view. A Hartian description of the form and structure of a state legal system
is likely to be rather thin and provides little or no guidance to judges and other
participants.
111 This observation is derived from my experience of trying to teach "customary
law" in the Sudan and East Africa. See TWINING, LIC, supra note 8, at Ch. 2.
112 TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 128-129. This paper is concerned in first
instance with legal scholarship and legal theory as well as with what is involved
in advancing understanding of law from a global or transnational perspective.
This paper only indirectly deals with the implications of this for the teaching of
law. At this stage in history, most forms of international and transnational legal
practice are quite specialized. On the one hand, few law students and legal
scholars can focus exclusively on a single jurisdiction; on the other hand, we are
some way from a situation in which primary legal education can sensibly be
geared to the production of global lawyers or Euro-lawyers, or even specialists
in international law. Law students can generally benefit from being presented
with broad perspectives and from being made aware of different levels of legal
ordering and their interactions. But I am personally somewhat skeptical about
the rapid development of global or radically transnational legal education, at
least at first degree level. In the United States, bar examinations are likely to be
better indicators of the impact of "globalization" on perceptions of legal practice
than issues about citing foreign precedents. For the foreseeable future, bar
examinations seem likely to focus almost exclusively on domestic law. A
cosmopolitan discipline does not mandate neglect of local knowledge. For the
time being, the rule of thumb should be "Think global, focus local."
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discipline has never been entirely local, it is becoming more
cosmopolitan. Legal scholarship and legal education have in fact
been quite responsive to changes associated with "globalization." For
example, in my own country, every law student is exposed to
European Community Law by studying the Human Rights Act to the
European Convention on Human Rights (1998). More and more
options are offered with an explicitly transnational focus: for
example, international trade, human rights, immigration law, and
internet law. Perhaps equally as important, is the fact that many
subjects are recognized as having important transnational dimensions,
for example, regulation, commercial law, environmental law,
intellectual property, and labor law. Family law and feminist legal
theory are becoming more sensitive to multiculturalism; challenges to
rigid views of sovereignty are explored in constitutional law as well
as international law and jurisprudence; a leading textbook on the
English legal system gives a prominent place to "alternative dispute
resolution"'1 3 and courses of that name are placing an increasing
emphasis on cross-cultural and trans-national negotiation, and
mediation. In a 1994 survey of LLB students at the University of
London, it was estimated that over two thirds of the courses dealt
mainly with international, transnational, foreign, or comparative
subjects.' 14
To sum up: concern that our discipline should not lose touch
with the local and the particular is well founded and nothing in this
paper is intended to suggest otherwise.
iii. Conceptual difficulties I: the problem of the definitional
stop
A more traditional concern has been with a version of the
floodgates argument. If the door is opened and some examples of
non-state law are added, then we are left with no clear basis for
differentiating legal norms from other social norms, legal institutions
and practices from other social institutions and practices, legal
traditions from religious or other general intellectual traditions and so
on. This can be characterized as the problem of the definitional stop.
113 ANTHONY BRADNEY AND FIONA COWNIE, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN
CONTEXT (2003).
114 TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 55-56.
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Within the literature of legal pluralism there have been three main
reactions to this problem.
First, some have tried to produce a general definition that
differentiates the legal from the non-legal. For example, Santos in the
first edition of Toward a New Common Sense produced a general
definition of law that was very close to that of the anthropologist E.
Adamson Hoebel. l" 5 Similarly, Teubner feels the need to do so.116
This is one of Tamanaha's central concerns in his A General
Jurisprudence of Law and Society. 1 7 He explicitly seeks to establish
criteria of identification that differentiate legal institutions from
institutions such as hospitals, schools, and sports leagues." l8 This
concern leads him to set up a "labeling test,"' 19 which several critics,
including myself, have rejected on the grounds that it conflates
analytic and folk concepts and that it is unworkable. 2 ° This deserves
to be seen as a valiant failure.
Second, there are those who take the position that the search
for a general definition of "law" is a futile pursuit. Many writers just
beg the question. "It just doesn't matter" writes Glenn, whether or not
"Cthonic law" is actually classified as law.121 While I am personally
sympathetic with such impatience, I prefer to use different
conceptions of law in different contexts. In some contexts, whether a
"' SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 106, at 112; E.
ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE
LEGAL DYNAMICS 28 (1954). This was the general definition that Llewellyn
refused to include in K.N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE
WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 41-47 (1992).
116 Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZOL. REV. 1443, 1451 (1992).
117 TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6, at xii-xiii.
"'
18Id. at 238-239.
119 Twining, PWCL, supra note 1, at 223.
120 Id. at 223, 229; Kenneth Einar Himma, supra note 89, at 718, 738; Roberts,
AIter Government?, supra note 85, at 20-22.
GLENN, supra note 25, at 69. For criticisms on Glenn's failure to distinguish
clearly between legal and religious aspects of a tradition in the context of his
general theory of legal tradition, see Twining, A Fresh Start, supra note 1.
However, Glenn may be defended on the ground that he is comparing
phenomena which are conventionally viewed as major legal traditions by outside
observers, but each of which conceptualizes religion and law and their relations
differently.
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particular set of phenomena is classified as legal or not may be
insignificant. For example, very little turns on whether the
phenomena under consideration are designated as "law" or not in
Weyrauch's account of "Gypsy law,"' 22 or Bradney and Cownie's of
"Quaker law,"'123 or Santos' account of "Pasagarda law,"'' 24 or The
Common Law Movement,' 25 or many of the classic accounts of
dispute processes in pre-literate societies, such as those of Gulliver on
the Arusha.126 Similarly Pistor and Wellons, in their excellent study of
law and economic development in Asia, conclude that nearly all
receptions of state law involve complex interactions between
imported official law and local "unofficial law."'127 It would not make
much difference to their study if they had not used the term "law" in
relation to local normative orders.
122 See GYPSY LAW: ROMANI LEGAL TRADITIONS AND CULTURE (Walter 0.
Weyrauch ed., 2001) [hereinafter GYPSY LAW]; and Walter 0. Weyrauch, The
Romani People: A Long Surviving and Distinguished Culture at Risk, 51 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 679-89 (2003) [hereinafter The Romani People].
123 See ANTHONY BRADNEY & FIONA COWNIE, LIVING WITHOUT LAW: AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF QUAKER DECISION-MAKING, DISPUTE AVOIDANCE AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2000) [hereinafter LIVING WITHOUT LAW].
124 SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 106, at 99-160.
125 The Common Law Movement is an offshoot of the militias in the United
States. See Susan P. Koniak, When Law Risks Madness, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. &
LIT. 65 (1996); and Susan P. Koniak, The Chosen People in our Wilderness, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1761, 1784-1785 (1997) (reviewing MORRIS DEES & JAMES
CORCORAN, GATHERING STORM (1996) and CATHERINE MCNICOL STOCK,
RURAL RADICALS: FROM BACON'S REBELLION TO THE OKLAHOMA CITY
BOMBING (1996)). To date I have yet to meet an American law student who had
heard about this bizarre phenomenon before taking a course on "Globalization
and Law." It deserves to be better known for several reasons: it is politically
and socially significant; it is a good example of a marginal candidate for being
called "non-state law;" in some respects it arguably fits the categories of illegal,
unnoticed, or mad legal orders, all of which raise issues in respect of legal
pluralism; and, like "Pasagarda law," its discourses echo or caricature those of
"official law."
126 P. H. GULLIVER, SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY 173-302 (1963).
127 KATHARINA PISTOR & P.A. WELLONS, RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960-95 (1999); see also
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant
Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163-201 (2003).
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However, sometimes the categorization may have some
significance. For example, it could be argued that Glenn needs a
distinction in the context of his proposition, for he treats legal
traditions as the main unit of comparison, without clearly
distinguishing between law and religion in respect of several
intellectual traditions. 121
Third, there are some, like Marc Galanter, who see the indicia
of "the legal" as a complex mix of attributes along one or more
continua so that it is artificial and misleading to prescribe precise
general boundaries at least outside a particular context.' 29 In practice,
Galanter ends up with a conception of "the legal" which is broader
and vaguer than Tamanaha's. Karl Llewellyn refused to include a
general definition of law in the Cheyenne Way for similar reasons,1
30
but as I have argued elsewhere, one can construct some general
indicia for differentiating legal from non-legal phenomena from
Llewellyn's law jobs theory on the basis of a kind of "thin
functionalism" while leaving borderline cases to be settled in a
specific context.'13  In the specific context of mapping law from a
global perspective, I have been willing to indicate some broad criteria
of identification not very different from Llewellyn's, but subject to
three caveats: first, that this is intended for no more than clarification
in a quite specific context; second, that it is not intended that this
characterization should bear much theoretical weight; and, third, that
this conception represents only one way among several for
categorizing the phenomena for this particular purpose.
132
128 GLENN, supra note 25. Note the criticism by several contributors to
Symposium on Glenn in Twining, A Fresh Start, supra note 1.
129 Mark Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981).
130 WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 177-79
(1973).
131 Twining, PWCL, supra note 1, at 237-43. The provisional formulation for
the specific purpose of constructing a broad overview of law from a global
perspective is: Law is a species of institutionalized social practice concerned
with the ordering of relations between subjects at various levels of relations and
of ordering. The elements in this formulation are elucidated, and its uses and
limitations will be explored in a forthcoming paper.
132 Twining, The Province of Jurisprudence Re-examined, supra note 1.
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If one is interested in the relations between municipal law and
other normative orders there are conceptual problems however one
defines or conceptualizes law. The definitional stop is only one of
several problems in this area most of which are unlikely to be
resolved by conceptual analysis or formal definitions alone.
iv. Conceptual difficulties I1 the distinctiveness of
centralized governance
A somewhat different concern has recently been expressed by
Simon Roberts. In his elegant Chorley Lecture for 2004, Roberts
criticizes attempts "to loosen the conceptual bonds between law and
government" and to broaden representations of law to include
negotiated orders, which have distinct rationalities and values.
33
Simon Roberts is a distinguished legal anthropologist who can hardly
be accused of being narrowly focused or indifferent to social context.
Indeed, his main concern seems to be that broadening our conceptions
of law may de-stabilize "the comparative project," obscure the
differences between state law and other forms of normative orders,
and in the process weaken our capacity to grasp the nature of
negotiated orders.
Roberts' lecture is an extension of an argument that he made
in "Against Legal Pluralism" in which he suggested "that it is
inevitably problematic to attempt to fix a conception of law going
beyond the robust self-definitions of state law."'134 In both papers,
Roberts is concerned that when enthusiastic jurists turn their attention
to non-state normative orders they are likely to try to interpret other
cultures through what are essentially lawyers' "folk concepts," or else
to indulge in an undisciplined and "eclectic resort to the theoretical
resources of the social sciences."'' 35  While acknowledging that a
sharp distinction between folk and analytic concepts can be
133 Roberts, After Government?, supra note 85.
134 Roberts, Against Legal Pluralism, supra note 85, at 105. Roberts is justified
in warning of the dangers ofjuricentrism. Lawyers may tend to view the world
through juricentric lenses, much as human beings tend to view the world
through ethnocentric lenses. However, not all jurists are confined by narrow
legalistic perspectives and it is one of the aims of a humanistic jurisprudence to
counter such tendencies, not least by acknowledging the continuities between
legal and other social phenomena.
131 Id. at 95.
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problematic, Roberts insists that only by working with this distinction
and looking for meaning at an analytic level can "the comparative
project" hope to achieve any stability.' 36
I personally find Roberts' argument puzzling because I agree
with nearly all of his main points, but I do not share his fears about
the consequences of adopting a broad conception of law for certain
purposes. Following his logic, I think that one of the main challenges
to comparative law and legal anthropology is the development of
usable analytic concepts. 137 For example, in the present context, I
have no reason to dissent from the following propositions:
(a) There are aspects of the form and structure of
state law that are clearly linked to
centralization, leadership, and governance. In
some respects, state law represents a
distinctive social form worthy of
conceptualization in a rigorous and precise
fashion. 138
(b) State/municipal law has been and is likely to
continue to be the main focus of attention of
legal scholars and legal practitioners. For the
foreseeable future, state law is likely to
become of great political and economic
significance.
(c) Broadening the concept of law to include
some non-state normative orders poses a
number of conceptual difficulties, including
problems of differentiating legal from "non-
legal" phenomena in different contexts and
136 Id. at 102-105; see also Roberts, After Government?, supra note 85, at 23-24.
137 TWINING, HCWT, supra note 1. But see, GLENN, supra note 25, at 46-67, for
a divergent approach, where Glenn writing about traditions argues against
looking for a tertium comparationis in comparing traditions.
138 Joseph Raz justifies confining his concept of law to municipal legal systems
because they are sufficiently important and sufficiently different from most
other normative systems to be made the object of a separate study. JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 105 (1979). Yet, Roberts makes further claims.
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individuating orders, systems, and semi-
autonomous social fields.139
(d) Confining one's conception of law to state law
involves no commitment to the idea that other
forms of normative ordering are unimportant
or unworthy of the attention of legal
scholars. 1
40
I also agree with some of Roberts' criticisms of Pospisil,
Sacco, Teubner, and Geertz 4 ' and with many, but not all, of his other
specific points. Consequently, I am left puzzled as to what we might
be disagreeing about. Surely, it cannot be just another return to
obsession with "the definition of law"? There might be more than
that, for the following two reasons.
First, Roberts' central concern is that "[a]s radically different
modes of ordering and decision are represented together as "legal,"
law loses analytic purchase.' 42  Here, it is useful to distinguish
between law as an analytic concept, law as an organizing concept, and
law as a rough way of designating a scholarly field or focus of
attention. Many of us feel that the concept of law has so many varied
associations that it is unwise to expect it to have much analytic
purchase. Unless a particular conception is specified with precision
in a particular context, the law is too abstract, too ambiguous, with
too many contested associations to perform that function.
Conversely, the concept of state or municipal law as one form of law
(as, for example, elucidated by Hart) can perform that function. It is
' See TWINING, HCWT, supra note 1.
140 However, one implication of Roberts' argument appears to be that our
colleagues in the Law Department of the School of Oriental and African Studies
who specialize in Islamic law, Buddhist law, Hindu law etc., are only studying
law insofar as the phenomena they study are closely connected with centralized
governance. My objection to this is not primarily with semantics or status;
rather it is that it reinforces their marginalization within our discipline and does
not really allow for the possibility of scholars studying religious law from a
juristic, as opposed to theological or historical or social scientific, perspective.
141 1 have made a similar critique of Tamanaha's labeling test for law. See
Twining, PWCL, supra note 1, at 223-43. But I sense that Roberts has unfairly
characterized Tamanaha's project.
142 Roberts, After Government?, supra note 85, at 23.
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difficult to see why substituting the term "state law" or "municipal
law" or something similar will not satisfy Roberts's concern. Hart's
own method helps to explain why law, apart from its various
meanings in ordinary usage, is not susceptible to definition per genus
et differentiam.43 It is too abstract to be satisfactorily elucidated as a
species of some even more abstract genus. Furthermore, the history
of jurisprudence and comparative law suggests that law is itself
unlikely to be satisfactory as a generic concept, with species and sub-
species that can be elucidated by reference to clear differentiae and
criteria of identification. Failed typologies of "legal families"
illustrate clearly: families were not species of a single genus. 44 The
familiar complexities surrounding the conceptualization of law are
also not simply resolved by resort to Wittgenstein's method of family
resemblances, although it can be of some assistance.
45
Brian Tamanaha tried to construct a conception of law that
would serve as "an organizing concept," i.e., it would pose as the
basis for a theoretical framework within which a wide range of
different forms of law can be accommodated and compared. By
eliminating nearly all of Hart's "essentialist" conditions for the
existence of a legal system, Tamanaha sought to include a wider
range of phenomena within a single framework while differentiating
between legal and other social institutions and practices. His criteria
of identification operate to exclude hospitals, schools, sports leagues
and table manners, but his ultimate test of inclusion has been shown
by critics to be inadequate. 46 In contrasting Tamanaha's umbrella
theory with Robert's analytic concepts, the former makes clear that
most analysis, comparison and explanation has to take place at lower
levels of abstraction thereby resulting in less work than the latter.
However, despite its limited purpose, Tamanaha's criterion of
identification flounders.
A third use of an abstract conception of law is to do no more
than roughly indicate a broad area of study. As we have seen, terms
14' H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L. Q. REV. 37, 57
(1954).
'44 Most commonly comparatists have referred to families of legal systems, but
have used "legal system" ambiguously. TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 178-84.
145 Twining, PWCL, supra note 1, at 238.
146 Id. at 223-43; Himma, supra note 89, Roberts, After Government?, supra
note 85, at 20-22.
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like legal theory, legal philosophy, and jurisprudence tend to be used
rather loosely. For special reasons, I have felt it important to stipulate
a rough working distinction between legal theory and legal
philosophy as its most abstract part. The terms are nevertheless vague
and rightly so. Few think it worthwhile to make them more precise;
indeed, false precision would be a fault. As we saw, Herbert Hart
said that legal philosophy has no clear boundaries which are generally
accepted. For the purpose of my argument about the focus of the
discipline of law, I have argued for a broadened view of the discipline
and a correspondingly inclusive conception of law. But what are, or
should be, the subject matters of particular fields of study is
historically contingent. In some contexts, adopting a broad
conception of a field rather than a narrow one can have important
intellectual consequences. However, in this context, the
consequences need not be nearly so dire as Roberts suggests. 147
A second point about Roberts' concern is that by subsuming
centralized systems of governance and negotiated orders under the
same conceptual roof, the distinctive nature of the latter will
disappear. Echoing the classic distinction between chiefly and
acephalous societies, he is keen to emphasize the differences between
the two categories. Roberts has done important work on "alternative
147 Roberts alleges that I have left myself "free to hold forth about whatever
aspect of the social world interests him from within the secure stockade of
jurisprudence." Roberts, After Government?, supra note 85, at 22. (Stating that
"[b]eyond its normative character, "law" seems to have no specificity
whatever."). Id. This is unfair in several respects. First, he quotes a passage in
a paper on diffusion, Twining, Diffusion of Law, supra note 1, where I say that I
will not repeat what I have said about the conceptual issues elsewhere, but he
does not give the cross-reference which to some extent meets his point.
Twining, PWCL, supra note 1. Second, it is not the case that I am prepared to
include "any old normative order" in my conception(s) of law in that specific
context (or some others). For example, I have made it clear that I do not usually
include the rules of ping pong, spelling, grammar, or many social conventions in
my conception(s) of legal rules. Nor do I treat social institutions such as
hospitals, schools or businesses as specifically legal institutions. Unlike
Tamanaha, however, I believe that the internal governance of some such
institutions can be usefully viewed as a form of legal order in some contexts.
Often, in writing about legal education, I proceed on the assumption that we are
mainly concerned with domestic municipal law in that context.
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dispute resolution"'148 and he has interesting propositions about the
appropriateness of trying to design institutions of third party
adjudication (such as international criminal tribunals) in the absence
of a strong centralized order.149 But he seems to postulate centralized
governance and negotiated orders as antiphonal ideal types in some
kind of binary opposition rather than providing for other variations
along a complex range of overlapping continua or some other more
complex picture. Thus, what Roberts presents is a narrow conception
of law and a typology of two main types of normative orders along a
continuum of centralization/decentralization. This seems to me to be
unnecessarily reductionist. The following examples do fit
comfortably within either ideal: Pasagarda Law as described by
Santos, 150 the Common Law Movement in the United States as
described by Koniak, 151 Quaker law as described by Bradney and
Cownie, 152 Gypsy law as described by Weyrauch, 153 and Hindu law as
described by Menski154 are examples that just do not fit either ideal
type at all comfortably. Similarly, in setting up his ideal type of
centralized authority, Roberts lumps together weak states, fragmented
states, failed states, tyrannies, states bedeviled by civil war, and so
on. 155 We need a much more complex framework of explication.
In sum, some of the concerns behind resisting to the idea of
non-state law deserve serious consideration. The central point is that
relations between municipal law and other forms of normative
ordering (however they are labeled) and other interactions
(interlegality) deserve the sustained attention of jurists because they
are a crucial part of understanding legal phenomena. Definition,
labeling or semantics are not the main concern.
148 See, e.g., SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1979); MICHAEL PALMER & SIMON ROBERTS, DISPUTE
PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING (1998).
149 Roberts, After Government?, supra note 85, at 23.
150 SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 106.
151 Koniak, When Law Risks Madness, supra note 125.
152 GYPSY LAW, supra note 122; and Weyrauch, The Romani People, supra note
122.
153 BRADNEY & COWNIE, LIVING WITHOUT LAW, supra note 123.
154 WERNER F. MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA (2000).
155 See, GLENN, A Nationalist Heritage, supra note 98.
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III. GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: AGENDAS AND ISSUES
I am sometimes asked to specify the kinds of issues and lines
of inquiry that I would include within my view of General
Jurisprudence. While this is a reasonable request,1 56 attempting to set
out a grand master plan or blueprint for what must be a collective
enterprise involving multiple perspectives and conceptions of the
subject-matters of our discipline that are as varied, fluid and multi-
layered as the discipline itself would be contrary to the spirit of this
paper. However, it is not difficult to illustrate some of the kinds of
inquiry that are suggested by adopting a global perspective and asking
what are the implications for theorizing about law.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth reiterating two points.
First, one or more general theories about the nature of law could at
best be a small part of the enterprise. Second, one of the strengths of
law as an institutionalized discipline is that it is continuously
stimulated by and responsive to events, problems, examples, and
ideas from other disciplines and "the real world" outside itself. For
the most part, it does not create its own agenda or feed off its own
questions and examples. Practice and specialized scholarship will
often come in advance of theory.
General jurisprudence as conceived in this paper is not an
entirely new enterprise involving a sharp break from the past. Our
discipline has long had its cosmopolitan aspects and in recent years it
has responded to the processes of "globalization" in a rich variety of
ways. These activities include many contributions that fit
comfortably within my conception of general jurisprudence.
Therefore, the point of this paper is as much to identify and interpret
trends as to advocate new directions. 157
156 Over the past five years I have undertaken a number of small case studies in
order to concretize and illustrate the general perspective. These include analysis
of discourses about rights, corruption, the treatment of prisoners, and the
comparative study of legal professions and legal education (analysis of
concepts); a study of the approaches of four "Southern" jurists to human rights
(Deng, An-Na-im, Ghai, and Baxi) (normative jurisprudence); an overview and
comparison of the legal and social science literatures on diffusion (socio-legal
studies); and critical analyses of assumptions of mainstream writings about
comparative law and transplants/ diffusion of law (critical jurisprudence).
157 Papers presented at the World Congress at Granada in May, 2005 amply
illustrate the variety of kinds of theoretical work that are responding to the
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In dividing jurisprudence into categories, many other scholars,
Julius Stone for example, set out a broad scheme into three or four
rough distinctions: Analytical Jurisprudence, Sociological (or
Functional) Jurisprudence, and Theories of Justice (or Critical or
Censorial or Ethical) Jurisprudence.158 I follow Stone in adopting a
broad conception of legal theory that is closely linked to law-as-a-
discipline and is skeptical of claims to autonomy of disciplines, but I
prefer to talk of analytical, normative, empirical, and critical
inquiries. Stone emphasized that his categorization was solely for
convenience of exposition.' 59 So long as they are recognized as a
very rough indication of areas of interest and inquiry, which overlap
and combine in myriad ways, either is a workable division. Most
scholarly inquiries in law involve a combination of analytical,
normative and empirical elements. In each of these areas, one can
identify examples of the kinds of tasks that may be performed by the
activity of theorizing, including synthesis, construction and
elucidation of concepts, critical development of normative principles,
hypothesis formation, middle order theorizing, participant working
theories, intellectual history, and critique.
160
Rather than attempt to be comprehensive in short compass, I
shall briefly illustrate the general point with reference to three of
many possible lines of development: exploiting the existing heritage
of juristic texts; critical reappraisal of areas of legal scholarship that
are significant transnationally; and linking legal theory more closely
to important general issues.
i. Mining the heritage
In considering the vast heritage of texts, ideas, and, theories
that constitute the heritage of legal thought one might suggest:
process of "globalization." See, e.g., MANUEL ESCAMILLA & MODESTO
SAAVEDRA, LAW AND JUSTICE IN GLOBAL SOCIETY (2005). As I said in my oral
presentation: "Si momentum requiris, circumspice."
158 See JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 16-19 (1956)
(discussed in Twining, The Province of Jurisprudence Re-examined, supra note
1, at 20).
159 Id. at 16.
160 See supra Part I.
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(a) Extending the canon and
reducing our ignorance of
other traditions.
Western jurists need to become better acquainted with the
leading thinkers and salient ideas and controversies in other legal
traditions. Some of the literature of non-Western legal traditions that
have until now been considered the province of specialists need to be
assimilated into the mainstream. This is a pre-condition for genuine
cross-cultural dialogue and for serious aspirations to universalism.
The task is daunting not least because of problems of selection,
accessibility, translation, interpretation, and depth. While managing
such a vast heritage is certainly cumbersome, fortunately, it includes
much excellent writing by Western scholars (notwithstanding
criticisms of "orientalism") and, to a lesser extent, accessible writings
by contemporary "Southern" jurists such as Abdullahi An-Na'im,
Upendra Baxi and others. 61 The task is huge, but it will continue to
be an essential part of developing a genuinely cosmopolitan
jurisprudence.
(b) Reviewing the canon.
It is worth asking if there are relevant texts in our own
tradition that have been marginalized or forgotten and that deserve to
be reinstated as being of particular relevance to a more cosmopolitan
legal theory. To the extent this inquiry is happening already, for
example Kant's "To Perpetual Peace" (1795)162 is receiving
newfound attention. Thinkers such as Grotius, Leibniz, and Vico may
also warrant renewed attention. Of Anglo-American texts that
deserve to be resurrected, I would include some of the works of Sir
Henry Maine, Jeremy Bentham's writings on colonialism,
international law and his (to me disappointing) essay on Time and
Place in Matters Legislation, and a refinement and development of
161 See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION:
CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990); UPENDRA
BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2006); Twining, Human Rights:
Southern Voices, supra note 1, at 203 (representing a modem step in the
direction of making such work by "Southern" Anglophone jurists better known).
162 See IMMANUEL KANT, KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 93 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B.
Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991).
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Karl Llewellyn's "law jobs" theory. 163  But this is just a list of
personal preferences.
(c) Reinterpreting the mainstream.
Third, it is worth taking a critical look at ideas of our own
current canonical jurists from a global perspective. A good is
example is Thomas Pogge's transfer of Rawls' theory of justice to the
world stage. Pogge explores the application of Rawls' principles of
justice to the design and operation of transnational and international
institutions and practices, much more convincingly than Rawls' own
The Law of Peoples'64 the application of Rawls' principles of justice
to the design and operation of transnational and international
institutions and practices. The result is to transform a fairly
comfortable theory of domestic justice into one that provides a
potentially radical critique of existing arrangements in the world as a
whole.165 Tamanaha's interpretation of Hart is another example.'
66
Some read Peter Singer's writings as the modem application of
Benthamite utilitarianism to global and transnational issues. 67
Interesting questions arise about the applicability of Dworkin's
Hercules to reasoning and interpretation in other juristic traditions.
163 TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 75-82.
164 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).
165 THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 276-277 (1989) (discussed in TWINING,
GLT, supra note 1, at 69-75). Pogge concludes: "[O]ur current global
institutional scheme is unjust, and as advantaged participants in this order we
share a collective responsibility for its injustice." Id. at 277. On a broader scale,
international ethics has made considerable strides in recent years through the
work of Amartya Sen, Brian Berry, Charles Beitz, Martha Nussbaum, Peter
Singer and others.
166 TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 6. Tamanaha's
elimination of nearly all of Hart's criteria of identification for a broad
conception of law narrows the application of Hart's theory. However, this does
not seriously undermine the analytical value of concepts such as the rule of
recognition, primary and secondary rules, the distinction between rules and
habits, all of which may be useful in analyzing both municipal legal systems and
some other normative orders.
167 See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION
(2002); see also SINGER AND HIS CRITICS (Dale Jamieson ed. 1999)
(demonstrating significant developments in the application of Bentham's
utilitarian principles to Singer's "practical ethics" approach).
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And one notes that there have been significant shifts in feminist
theory occurred as its geographical horizons have broadened. 168 The
reinterpretation of familiar texts from a global perspective is well
under way.
ii. Re-thinkings
One of the tasks of theorizing is the articulation and critical
appraisal of the presuppositions and working concepts of legal
discourse generally and of more specialized areas. As the processes
of globalization impact upon and give greater prominence to
transnational fields such as comparative law, public international law,
human rights law, international economic and financial law, regional
regimes and so on, there is a corresponding need to subject their
assumptions and discourses to critical scrutiny. This has already
happened to a significant extent in some areas. In the 1980's,
anthropologists, including legal anthropologists, recognized that they
had often erred in treating small-scale societies as timeless, self-
contained units and have since then been more sensitive to the
broader contexts of history and geography. 169 The writings of Philip
Allott, Richard Falk, Fernando Tes6n, and other theorists in
international law are clearly contributions to general jurisprudence.
Similarly, in recent years, scholarly articles have mounted a sustained
critique from a number of directions on mainstream comparative
law.' 7
0
Perhaps some of the most important developments are taking
place in relation to socio-legal studies, usually at the level of middle
168 See, e.g., WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN
CAPABILITIES (Martha Nussbaum & Jonathon Glover eds., 1995); HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Rebecca
Cook ed., 1994); Annelise Riles, The Virtual Sociality of Rights: The Case of
Women's Rights are Human Rights, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 420-
439 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
169 HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW (Jane Collier & June Starr eds.,
1989) marks the change of perspective in legal anthropology.
170 See, e.g, Twining, Comparative Law and Legal Theory, supra note 18;
LEGRAND, supra note 26, at 240-311; Mathias Reiman, The End of Comparative
Law as an Autonomous Discipline, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. F. 49 (1996); Mathias
Reiman, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671
(2004); and TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 174-93.
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order theory. For example, some of the best theoretical work in
recent years has been done in relation to transnational aspects of
regulation, regional governance, and environmental protection. 171
iii. "Relevance"
We have seen that there is a quite widespread feeling that
some recent legal philosophizing has lost touch with mainstream legal
scholarship and legal practice. 72 By contrast, legal scholars have
been quite responsive to the stimuli of "globalization," sometimes to
the extent that some may feel that some transnational fields have
become too fashionable. Without entering into debates about the
"relevance" of theory, let me touch on two aspects of this
responsiveness.
First, there are number of specialized fields of legal
scholarship that have become more salient because of recent
developments. For example, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, in a
magisterial survey of areas of law that are likely to be affected by
"globalization" at global, state, and local levels, lists the following in
his "research agenda": the globalization of nation-state regulation;
regimes of regional integration; lex mercatoria; the law of people on
the move (migration, displaced persons, refugees, citizenship); the
law of indigenous peoples; human rights; ius humanitatis (the
171 See generally on regulation: REGULATING LAW (Christine Parker, Collin
Scott, Nicola Lacey, & John Braithwaite eds., 2004); ABRAHAM CHAYES &
ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); BRAITHWAITE, GLOBAL
BUSINESS REGULATION, supra note 100; see generally on the EU and legal
theory: CONSTRUCTING LEGAL SYSTEMS: 'EUROPEAN UNION' IN LEGAL THEORY
(Neil MacCormick ed., 1997); IAN WARD, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO
EUROPEAN LAW (2003); IAN WARD, JUSTICE, HUMANITY, AND THE NEW
WORLD ORDER (2004); JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE:
"DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?" AND OTHER ESSAYS OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999); see generally on environmental protection:
MARIA LEE, EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CHALLENGES, CHANGE AND DECISION-
MAKING (2005); LAW AND GEOGRAPHY (Jane Holder and Carolyn Harrison
eds., 2003); JONAS EBBESON, ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS
(2002).
172 See TWINING, GJB, supra note 1, at 73.
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common heritage of mankind); 173 and "global reform of courts"
(including the exportation of the "Rule of Law" and ideas of
representative democracy, and the judicialization of politics). 74 Of
course, this list is not comprehensive. Santos's criteria of significance
are directly related to his particular ideological standpoint. Others
might add communications, regulation of financial markets, nuclear
proliferation, transnational crime, responses to terrorism, the arms
trade, crimes against humanity, among a huge variety of other
agendas. Certainly, in respect of each field there are potential issues
deserving of theoretical attention at local (i.e. specialized) levels and
at various higher levels of abstraction. Santos is an example of a
jurist who has tried to develop an overarching social theory of law,
which is closely related to concrete social and political issues and
trends. 175
Legal theory can develop on the back of specialized areas of
legal scholarship; of course, it can also respond directly to what are
perceived to be major global issues, such as war and peace, poverty,
economic and social development, environmental issues, pandemics,
genocide, terrorism and so on. 176  Again there are many lists and
173 This seems to be an important example of a concept that could benefit from
further rigorous philosophical analysis and development.
174 SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE, supra note 106, at Ch. 5,
6.
175 TWINING, GLT, supra note 1, at 194-244, includes a detailed critique of
SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE, supra note 106. The subsequent
Santos' text - TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE, supra note 106 -
contained some substantial revisions.
176 Nearly forty years ago Julius Stone wrote a paper on "Trends in
Jurisprudence in the Second Half Century" printed in BARBARA HATHAWAY,
JULIUS STONE: A BIO-BIOGRAPHY (1980). This can make for quite depressing
reading in that the agenda of issues still looks quite contemporary, some debates
that he treated as overworked are still alive, and some of the issues in his
program have not yet been implemented, including the better integration of
analytical and socio-legal approaches. Twining, The Province of Jurisprudence
Re-examined, supra note 1. But there have been some changes: for example the
question: "in what ways might state law (or law more broadly conceived) serve
to further or obstruct the attainment of the Millennium Goals?" is a good deal
more promising than the highly ambiguous question: "What is the role of law in
development?" about which members of the Law and Development agonized, to
little avail.
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agendas, representing different standpoints, ideologies, and interests.
One should not expect a consensus. But adopting a global perspective
and asking what are the implications of "globalization" for
jurisprudence and the discipline of law can at least stimulate thought
and debate about potential new lines of inquiry and the directions in
which we, as jurists, should be heading.

